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Abstract 
In order to investigate the potential determinants of credit risk in Chinese commercial 
banks, a panel dataset includes 342 bank-year observations from 2003 to 2012 in 
Chinese commercial banks are used to quantify the relationship between the selected 
variDEOHVDQG&KLQHVHEDQN¶VFUHGLW ULVN%DVHGRQVHYHUDO UREXVW WHVW WKHHPSLULFDO
results suggest the inflation rate and loan loss provision is significantly positive to 
&KLQHVH FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV¶ FUHGLW ULVN RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG PDUNHW LQWHUHVW UDWH
exchanJH UDWH  XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH EDQN VL]H UHJXODWRU\ FDSLWDO DQG EDQN¶V
management efficiency are exhibit a significantly negative relationship between the 
EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN +RZHYHU WKH UHDO *'3 JURZWK UDWH KDV QR VLJQLILFDQW HIIHFWV RQ
credit risk in Chinese Commercial bank market. Furthermore, after adding two 
dummy variables, which control the nature of ownership structure and the 2008 global 
financial crisis, into the model, the results indicate state-owned banks are will take on 
more risks than the others, however, the 2008 global financial crisis has no significant 
impacts on the credit risk level in Chinese banking industry.  
 
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature of determinants of Chinese commercial 
EDQNV¶FUHGLWULVN WKURXJKFRPELQHGWKe macro- and micro (bank-specific) variables 
together, the resulted model can be beneficial for the banking practitioners to have a 
better quantified model to analysis the credit risk in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
ACKNOWLEGEMENT 
 
I would first express my deep gratitude to my parents, who always give me great 
spiritual and financial supports to help me chase my dream. 
 
I sincerely express my gratitude to Dr. Robert. Young who has given me invaluable 
insights and unconditional support when I doing the researches and writing this 
dissertation. It is my honor to be his student, thanks for his earnest teachings, ³(YHU\
MRXUQH\EHJLQVZLWKWKHILUVWVWHS´DQG,ZLOOEHDU this in mind in my future life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1:  Introduction.................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter 2:  Background................................................................................................................. 12 
2.1 Chinese Economy development ............................................................................................ 12 
2.2 Chinese Banking Sector ......................................................................................................... 14 
2.3 Different Types of Chinese commercial banks ...................................................................... 16 
2.4 2008 Global Financial Crisis ................................................................................................... 16 
2.5 Basel Accords ........................................................................................................................ 18 
2.5.1 Basel I ............................................................................................................................. 18 
2.3.1 Basel II ............................................................................................................................ 19 
2.3.2 Basel III ........................................................................................................................... 21 
Chapter 3:  Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 22 
3.1 Economic theory of Credit risk .............................................................................................. 22 
3.1.1 Adverse Selection ........................................................................................................... 22 
3.1.2 Moral Hazard .................................................................................................................. 23 
3.2 Credit risk measurement ....................................................................................................... 24 
3.2.1 Traditional credit risk measurement model ................................................................... 24 
3.2.2 Modern credit risk measurement model ....................................................................... 27 
3.3 Literature review for credit risk determinants ...................................................................... 32 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic determinants ....................................................................................... 32 
3.3.2 Bank-Specific Determinants ........................................................................................... 37 
Chapter 4:  Methodology .............................................................................................................. 43 
4.1 Research Econometric Model ............................................................................................... 43 
4.2 Estimation Techniques .......................................................................................................... 44 
4.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation ................................................................................ 44 
4.2.2 Fixed Effects Estimation ................................................................................................. 45 
4.2.3 General Least Squares Estimation .................................................................................. 47 
4.3 The selection criteria of estimation techniques .................................................................... 47 
4.3.1 Random Effects Model or Pooled Model ....................................................................... 47 
4.3.2 Random Effects Model or Fixed Effects Model .............................................................. 47 
4.4 Variables and research models ............................................................................................. 48 
4.4.1 Dependent Variable ....................................................................................................... 48 
4.4.2 Explanatory variables ..................................................................................................... 49 
4.4.2 Dummy Variables ........................................................................................................... 55 
6 
 
4.5 Data ....................................................................................................................................... 59 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 5:  Empirical Results and Discussion................................................................................ 63 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 79 
6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 79 
6.1 Findings ................................................................................................................................. 80 
6.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research ........................................................ 83 
Reference ........................................................................................................................................ 84 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction  
 
³,I\RXRZHWKHEDQNWKDW¶V\RXUSUREOHP,I\RXRZHWKHEDQNPLOOLRQ
WKDW¶VWKHEDQN¶VSUREOHP´ 
                                 --John Paul Getty  
 
Credit risk is one of the oldest forms of risk in the financial markets. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) defined the credit risk as ³the potential 
that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance 
ZLWKDJUHHGWHUPV´. For the most banks, loans are the largest part of the bank assets, 
therefore the credit risk is the most important and primary risk in banks. Since credit 
risk can causes the potential of exterminate HQRXJKRIDEDQN¶VFDSLWDOWKHQIRUFe the 
bank into failure, manage the credit risk is the main challenge for running a bank 
business (Broll, et al., 2002). 
 
As the bank is at the forefront of the financial world, therefore the banks are 
considered to be the most vulnerable business. Normally, risk is observable when the 
capital markets is fricWLRQOHVV WKXV XQGHU WKH HIIHFWLYH ULVN PDQDJHPHQW EDQN¶V
managers can maximize D EDQN¶V ULVN-adjusted return by recognize credit risk thus 
PDLQWDLQWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWH[SRVXUHWRDQDFFHSWDEOHOHYHOV (Kargi, 2011). If the risks 
cannot be monitored and managed properly, it will result in the failures of banks. The 
collapse of banks will cause financial crisis. 2008 global financial crisis, which 
originated in the second half of 2007 from the US sub-prime mortgage market, has 
caused an increasing volatility in world widely financial markets. MUFG, which is the 
biggest bank in Japan, is cutting 2,000 jobs at its head office and closing 50 branches 
due to the financial crisis in 2008 (Nakamoto, 2009). Such a huge losses caused by 
2008 financial crisis not only reveals the vulnerabilities of the financial markets but 
also exposed the poor risk management decisions.  
As the development of Chinese economy, together with a proactive fiscal policy and 
8 
 
loose monetary policy, the Chinese banking industry has a rapid expansion in the past 
IHZ\HDUV(YHQWKRXJK&KLQD¶VEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\KDVLPSOHPHQWHGDVHULHVUHIRUPVLQ
the past three decades, it still far from being a developed, efficient system when 
compared with the foreign developed banking system and there still have many 
problems do not really resolved, such as administrative intervention from government, 
irrational allocation of resources, the pattern of the old regime and institutional issues 
(Cheng, et al., 2013) )URP WKH EDQN¶V SHUVSHFWLYH WKH ZHDN ULVN PDnagement and 
internal control lead to bank risk at a prominent position, especially the high 
non-performing loans ratio. A high proportions of non-performing loans lead to 
Chinese banks with a serious financial fragility (Bonin and Huang, 2001), the 
non-peUIRUPLQJORDQVKDYHUHDFKHGWULOOLRQ<XDQLQ³%LJ)RXU´EDQNVZKLFKLV
account for 25.6% of all loans, in June 1997. After china joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001, as the discriminatory restrictions of foreign banks were 
gradually disappeared, Chinese domestic banks are facing an increasing pressure of 
competition. Thus how to narrow the gap between foreign developed banks and 
improve the market competitiveness is becoming a major challenge faced by Chinese 
commercial banks.  
 
The effective credit risk management level of a commercial bank can be determined 
by the quality of credit assets. A poor credit risk management will lead to the large 
amount of Non-performing loans of banks, and finally lead banks into bankruptcy. As 
the Economist magazine declared in the end of 1990s, according to the contemporary 
non-SHUIRUPLQJ ORDQV DQG FDSLWDO &KLQD¶V IRXU VWDWH-owned banks should be 
bankruptcy three times (Cheng, et al. 2013). Thus non-performing loans will directly 
affect the stability of Chinese banking sector. In order to maintain the stability and 
healthy of Chinese financial markets, how to improve the loan quality thus lower the 
Non-performing loans has attracted much attention among Chinese banks.  
 
The study for investigate the determinants of credit risk in Chinese commercial banks 
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influence the credit risk, the government and bank managers can implement the 
corresponding policy to maintain the Chinese banking industry in a stability level. 
According to KMV and CreditMetrics model, the credit risk is affected by the 
borrower¶s characteristic such as the asset value and volatility of asset returns, the 
effects of industry, geography and the size of firm. Moreover, the Credit Portfolio 
View model describes that the default probability is driven by the macroeconomic 
factors, e.g. interest rate, exchange rate and GDP growth rate.  
 
Moreover, most of previous studies have investigated the determinants of EDQN¶V
credit risk, the explanatory variables are focus on macro-economic determinants or 
bank-specific determinants separately, but not too many studies combine those two 
classes together, Rinaldi and Sanchez-Arellano (2006) analyze the household 
Non-performing Loans based on several macroeconomic determinants for a panel of 
European countries, which are disposable income, unemployment and monetary 
conditions. Berge and Boye (2007) find the problem loans are highly affected by the 
real interest rates and unemployment in Nordic banking system over the year 1993 to 
2005. Other similar studies focusing on the macroeconomic determinants of credit 
risk include Nkusu (2011), Boss, et al. (2009). On the other hand, Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) focus on the relationship between bank-specific characteristics, e.g. 
efficiency indicators, with problem loans. It can be concluded that the bank credit risk 
can be affected by three main aspects, the macroeconomic conditions, bank-specific 
factors and the counterparty characteristics. To my knowledge, in the Chinese context, 
there are few studies of empirical credit risk determinants analysis. This study will 
contribute to fill this gap and explore the determinants of credit risk in combined with 
both Macroeconomic variables and bank-specific variables together. Furthermore, as 
the ownership structure fundamentally determines the corporate governance 
mechanisms and behavior choices, thus the effects of the ownership of commercial 
banks credit risk will be discussed in this study. At last, the relationship analysis 
between the global financial crisis and the Chinese commercial banks credit risk 
taking will be involved in this study as well.  
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As the purpose of this study is to investigate the potential determinants of the credit 
risk thus examines their relationship and effectsto credit risk in Chinese Commercial 
Banks.A quantitative research method will be used, which by means of gathering the 
data from various sources and the determinants of credit risk with their relative 
proxies which are based on a range of theory, a panel data set will be produced. The 
GHWHUPLQDQWV ZLOO EH DQDO\VHG LQ WKLV VWXG\ LV ³3DQHO GDWD UHJUHVVLRQ´ 8QGHU WKLV
approach, one of three types of regressions will be used: (1) Ordinary Least Square, (2) 
Random Effects or (3) Fixed Effects, several robust tests will be used to 
determinewhich approach will be the most appropriate one.  
 
An unbalanced annual panel dataset with 64 Chinese commercial banks are collected 
from the annual balance sheet and income statements of commercial banks from Fitch 
,%&$%XUHDX YDQ 'LMN¶V%DQN6FRSH GDWDEDVH )LWFK ,%CA) was employed in this 
study, the ownership information are from the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, and the macroeconomic data from the Chinese Almanac of Finance and 
World Banks. The dataset spans over the year 2003 to 2010. 
 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 describes the background of Chinese economy and banking system. 
Moreover, as the Chinese banks manage the credit risk depend on both national 
policies and international standards, the Basel Accords published by the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) will be introduced in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 describes an extensive literature review which includes the economic 
theory of credit risk, credit risk measurement and the previous studies relevant to 
credit risk determinants, describes the relevant economic theory of WKHEDQN¶VFUHGLW
risk. 
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Chapter 4 in conjunction with the literature review then identifying the variables and 
their relevant proxies, theoretical and empirical aspects will be merged with the 
methodological approach of this research. After introduce three regression estimation 
techniques, hypotheses will be set up based on the potential relationship between 
credit risk and explanatory variables, the descriptive statistics of the data also will be 
introduced in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 5 will summarizes the regression results and then discuss the results in 
detailed. The findings not only include the impacts of macroeconomic and 
bank-specific variables, but also through adding two dummy variables into the model 
to investigate the impacts from the ownership structure and 2008 global financial 
crisis.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes with a critical evaluation and conclusion of the research. 
Limitations of the dissertation and recommendations for the future improvement will 
also be discussed.  
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Chapter 2:  Background  
 
This section provides background necessary in understanding the empirical modeling 
of Chinese commercial banks credit risk. It consists of the discussion of Chinese 
economic development over the past decades in China, a brief overview for the 
Chinese banking sector and 2008 global financial crisis. Furthermore, international 
regulations framework, Basel Accords, are also discussed in this chapter.  
 
2.1 Chinese Economy development 
 
China started its transition from planning to market economics in 1978. Gradual 
economic transition has allowed China maintain a significant rate of growth and to 
smooth the private sector integration into the global economy. Over the past two 
decades, the Chinese economy grew phenomenally after access into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on 2001. The average growth rate of GDP is 10.46 percent over 
the past 10 years. Figure 2.1 shows the real GDP growth rate from the year 2003 to 
$VWKHHQGRIWKH&KLQD¶VQRPLQDO*URVV'RPHVWic Product reached 8.227 
trillion US dollar, which is the second largest economy in the world. According to the 
World Bank estimation, China now is the second largest trading nation in the world. 
In China, the export has started contributing significantly to growth of economy, as 
shown in the Figure 2.2, the average export is above 33.53 percent of GDP, the 
booming trade surplus fuelled economic growth over the past years. However, the 
export suffered a difficult time after the 2008 global financial crisis, which has a 
significantly restrained the global demand. The net exports fell 44.8% estimated by 
the Chinese government in year 2009, which affect the economy as a 3.9% decrease 
of GDP. In November 2008, Chinese Government launch a fiscal stimulus, which 
include 4 trillion RMB (about 586 billion US dollar), consequently, Chinese GDP 
growth rate maintained at 9.2 percent in 2009.  
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The huge achievement in economy growth are also supported by massive investment 
from the banking sector, especially in the post- 2008 global financial crisis, given lack 
of well functioned capital market in China (Deng et al, 2011). Chinese banking 
system play an important role in Chinese economy development as it can be treated as 
DILVFDODJHQWRIJRYHUQPHQWE\SROLF\OHQGLQJ(VSHFLDOO\IRUWKH&KLQD¶VVWDWH-owned 
banks, a large amount of lending flow into the largest non-financial state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Many state owned enterprises invest their loans into the real estate 
purchases, and thus expanding housing development activities in 2009. Real prices of 
property have been increased about 225% over the past ten years (Wu et al, 2010). 
 
Even China economy achieved a huge development in the past several decades. There 
still has several imbalances problem. Compared with the SOEs, according to pre-tax 
return on equity (ROE), private firms is more profitable than SOEs. Furthermore, 
private firms have a lower level of indebtedness and a lower debt/equity ratio. 
(Bongini, et al., 2009). Even though, private companies are still face the difficulties in 
their access to bank credit. Furthermore, as a response to the global financial crisis, 
investment has been allocated on the basis of central and local government guidelines, 
DQGPDLQO\ ILQDQFHG WKURXJK62(¶V ORDQVZKLOH VPDOODQGPHGLXPHQWHUSULVHV WKH
main component of the private sector, have a more limited access to finance despite 
the lending expansion (Dorrucci, et al, 2013). 
 
The rapid credit growth and rising property price draw more attention to the amount 
of lending and asset quality of banks. In Bloomberg report, it indicate that Chinese 
banks are told by the regulatory that they have not set sufficient funds to cover the 
losses on loans to local government financing, thus make them to accelerate more 
debt collection (Somayaji, 2011). According to Pitsilis et al. (2004), on year 2004, 
SOEs were receiving about 65% of total loans, even if the contribution of SOEs to 
Chinese GDP was around 25%. Compared with the private companies, the relative 
figures are 20% and 45%, respectively. The public ownership can be seen as one of 
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the reason for the fragility of Chinese banking.  
 
Figure 2.1 China Real GDP Growth Rate 2003-2012 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Export of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  
 
 
2.2 Chinese Banking Sector 
 
In the past three decades, Chinese banking industry has experienced an extraordinary 
reform process. Before Chinese economic reforms started in 1978, the Chinese 
banking system is mainly controlled by the government and isolated from the global 
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economy (Martin, 2012). Through such a reform process, the Chinese banking 
industry has been transformed from a mono-bank model into a multi-bank model, thus 
from a monopoly to competition and from long-term isolation to relatively open, both 
the Chinese banking system and Chinese economic are promoted. 
 
The first ran of the banking reform was from 1978 to 1986, during this stage, a new 
policy implemented by government to required the banks to take over the financing 
function from governments, which lend money to State-Owned enterprises without 
any interest rate charges. In other words, the central banks granted the deposit and 
lending business to newly established state-owned specialized banks.  
 
The second phase of reform implemented from the 1986 to 1994. The Provisional 
Rules Governing banks, which were promulgated in 1986, listed the division of 
business among central bank, state-owned specialized banks, and other financial 
institutions. The Rules admitted that the banking system had changed from being a 
one-tier system, wLWK WKH 3HRSOH¶V %DQN RQO\, to a two-tier system, which with the 
3HRSOH¶V %DQN DQG VSHFLDOL]HG EDQNV DQG RWKHU Wypes of financial institutions. New 
financial institutions were permitted entry into the banking market, most of them are 
set up as joint-stock banks (Li, 2011). 
 
However, the state-owned specialized banks managed the credit risk ineffectively, and 
the lending activities are intervened by the local government seriously, a large amount 
of loans were issued on a political basis and with a lower charged interest rate ( Li, 
2011). Under these adverse conditions, the third stage reform with aims to help the 
commercial banks to grant commercially-oriented loans was begun in 1995,  the Act 
RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD RQ &RPPHUFLDO %DQNV  and the Act of the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDRQWKH3HRSOH¶V%DQNRI&KLQDwas implemented, similar 
to the Basel Accords, the key aim of those two acts is to improve the awareness of 
credit risk for banks during the lending process, therefore to make commercial banks 
more responsible for profitability then lead to bank conduct a more prudential 
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operations . 
 
2.3 Different Types of Chinese commercial banks 
 
Ownership structure of commercial banks can determine the corporate governance 
PHFKDQLVPVDQG WKHEHKDYLRU FKRLFHV WKHUHIRUH DIIHFWV WKHEDQN¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQG
risk-taking (Cheng, et al. 2013).  
 
There are several types of bank operate in China. The first type is the wholly 
state-owned banks. 7KH VHFRQG FDWHJRULHV LQFOXGHV ³HTXLWL]HG´ FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV
(state-owned commercial banks), which normally the Chinese central government is 
the largest stockholder. After the reforms of banking system, five of the previously 
state-owned policy banks were transformed into the joint-stock companies, the 
majority of shareholders for those state-owned commercial banks are WKH 3HRSOH¶V
Bank of China (BOC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), or other government entities 
(Michael, 2012). The third type consists of a variety of local banks, which provincial 
and municipal as the major stakeholder. This types of banks includes a variety of 
financial institutions, the largest portion is City commercial banks. The fourth 
category encompasses of Chinese joint-stock commercial banks which with a lower 
levels of government ownership. Furthermore, as China joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the discriminatory restrictions on foreign bank entry was 
removed on December 2006 (Cheng, et al, 2013), made many foreign banks enter into 
the chinese financial market. At the end of 2008, 30 foreign-owned banks have been 
registered in China; 75 banks from 25 countries and regions have 153 branches in 
China; 196 banks from 46 countries and regions have established 238 offices in China. 
(Cheng, et al. 2013).  
 
2.4 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
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The prolusion of the 2008 global financial crisis was the 2007 U.S subprime 
Mortgage Crisis (Naudé, 2009). Before 2007, the mortgage industry was thriving and 
the sub-prime market had a dramatically development. Sub-prime loans are simply 
loans that would not be lending to borrowers under normal standards (Bessis, 2010). 
Compared with other types of mortgages, sub-prime loans are collateralized by real 
estate property and it rely on the expectation that house price will goes up, therefore 
with the more valuable collateral, transform the sub-prime loans in a prime mortgage. 
Under the favorable economic environment with a low interest rate, large capital 
flows, people are over optimism to the market. At the beginning, the subprime 
PRUWJDJHV RQO\ DFFRXQWHG IRU  RI WKH ZRUOG¶V GHEW VWRFN DQG  RI 86 QHZ
mortgage, therefore it is assumed to have limited effects on the national and world 
economy (Persaud, 2008). Finally, as the house booming in U.S which had been 
formed under the 7% annually increasing, the house mortgages rose significantly, also 
it consisted a large amount of subprime mortgages (Bullard et al, 2009), Due to the 
default probabilities of mortgages were underestimated, finally led to unreasonable 
pricing (Shefrin, 2009). 
 
In the mid of 2007 the housing price began to decline , as the investors began to doubt 
the real value of the structured securities which were based on the real estate collateral, 
many of these financial assets are traded and thus lead the prices started to fail, and 
finally caused a worldwide financial crisis. The collapse of economy bubble and 
Sub-prime crisis began with unemployment ratio goes up and difficulties for both 
banks and households in restoring in their balance sheet. Thus finally atrophies the 
whole economy. The U.S sub-prime crisis soon spread to a world-wide range. As the 
stock market fall over the world, some developed cRXQWULHV¶JRYHUQPHQWVKDGWREDLO
out their financial systems. At the end of 2009, the U.S government had already spent 
$9.7 trillion in bailout packages, and European countries spent more than $2 trillion to 
reduce the effect of such economy decline (Shah, 2010).  
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2.5 Basel Accords 
 
As the development of globalization and increasing in the world widely banking 
activities, in order to meet the need of the international cooperation in bank regulation 
and the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) promulgated several guidance 
on issues which are important to keep the health of banking systems over the world, 
the Basel Accords were produced. The foundation of the Basel Accords is the capital 
adequacy principle, which ensures the banks maintain a sufficient capital level. 
Furthermore, it also can level the competitive positions of banks in different countries. 
Basel Accord I, Basel Accord II, Basel Accord III will be briefly introduced in this 
section.  
 
2.5.1 Basel I 
 
Basel I was published by the BCBS in 1988, then enforced by law in 1992 (Bessis, 
2010). It set a series minimum capital adequacy requirement for banks. Basel I use the 
capital to risk-ZHLJKWHGDVVHWVUDWLRWRGHWHUPLQHWKHEDQN¶VFDSLWDODGHTXDF\. Under 
Basel I, the bank capital can be classified into two categories: Tier 1 and tier 2 capital. 
Tier 1 capital can be also called ³FRUHFDSLWDO´ it consists of highest quality and cost 
capital, e.g. common stock and cash and the items with a lower repayment priority in 
the case the bank goes to bankruptcy. Tier 2 capital is lower quality than tier 1, it 
includes the fund that available but not entirely controlled by the bank. BDQN¶s capital 
aims to provide a cushion to the losses in the bDQN¶VDVVHW%DVHO,require a bank to be 
considered have a sufficient capital it should hold a capital ratio of 8%, which means 
WKH YDOXH RI EDQN¶V FDSLWDO KDG WR HTXDO DW OHDVW  RI WKH YDOXH RI WKH EDQN¶V
risk-weighted assets, however, Basel I also required that tier 1 capital should account 
half of this 8%. 
 
Basel I established four risk categories for the assets held by commercial banks into 
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four categories (0%, 20%, 50% and 100%), it determined the proportion of WKDWDVVHW¶V
value would be included in the Risk-weighted assets, according to Basel I, riskier 
assets will account for more in DEDQN¶VRisk-weighted Assets value, while means an 
LQFUHDVHLQWKHEDQN¶VFDSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQW)RUH[DPSOHKROGLQJFDVKKDYHwill have 
no loss for banks therefore all cash will be placed into 0% risk category. Similarly, a 
loan made a Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
member country was expected as at a low-risk then it will placed in the 0% risk 
category as well. However, assets such like commercial loans, e.g. loans lend to 
business are considered as high-risk and according to the Basel Accords I, it should be 
included into the 100% risk category.  
 
The Basel I had been criticized since it was published. Firstly, the agreements of Basel 
, ZDV ³QRW OHJDOO\ ELQGLQJ XQGHUPLQLQJ LWV HIIHFWLYHQHVV´ +DOO  6HFRQGO\ 
Basel I is the risk-weighting system is arbitrary and not nearly sensitive enough to the 
unique risks associated with each asset held by a bank, e.g. not all the commercial 
loans borrower share the same amount of risk. According to Bessis (2010), the author 
point out that Basel I was not sensitive enough due to the minimum capital 
requirement was both for large and small banks.  
 
2.3.1 Basel II 
 
Basel II was organized by BCBS in 2004, with the aim of complementing and 
corrects the drawbacks of Basel I. The Basel II accord use three approaches, also be 
called DV³WKUHH3LOODU´WRDGGUHVV the credit risk problems of banks. Pillar I addresses 
the capital adequacy problem, Pillars II and Pillars III deal with supervisory review 
process and market discipline issues, respectively. The capital adequate ratio for Basel 
II is the same as the Basel I, which requires the bank total capital equals to at least 8% 
RIWKHEDQN¶VULVNZHLJKWDVVHWV7LHUFDSLWDOVKRXOGhave more than a half (4%) of 
risk-weighted assets.  
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Pillar I include three approaches to measuring credit risk: the Standardized Approach, 
the Foundation Internal Rating-Based Approach (FIRB), and the Advanced Internal 
Ratings-Based Approach (AIRB). The standardized approach for risk-weighting is not 
the same with %DVHO,¶VLQVHYHUDOZD\V%DVHO,,¶VVWandardized approach expands risk 
categories from 4 to 6. The standardized approach is suitable for the banks without 
enough credit rating capacity, furthermore, to solve the problem that there is no two 
assets share same risk profiles, the Basel II standardized approach attempt to make the 
risk-weighting determination according to the unique risk associated with each of the 
EDQN¶V DVVHWV LW GHWHUPLQH ZKLFK EXFNHW DQ DVVHW LV SODFHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH
credit-rating agencies. Furthermore, the risk-weighting an asset not only depends on 
DVVHW¶V FUHGLW UDWLQJEXWDOVRon what does the assets represent. For example, under 
the Basel I, all the commercial loans will be placed at a 100% risk bucket, however, in 
Basel II, the commercial loans with a higher rating from the Standard & Poor, say 
AAA, will be placed in the 20% risk categories.Moreover, a given credit rating is 
different between the government asset and private party, a government asset will in a 
lower category even the credit rating is the same with private one. Compared with 
other two approaches, the standardized approach is the one requires the simplest 
calculation but with the highest capital burdens (Bessis, 2010). 
 
The FIRB and AIRB approach encourage the banks develop their internal rating for 
their assets. So these two approaches are much more suitable for the large banks 
which have capacity to implement them. Banks can anticipate and prepare for the 
expected future losses through analyzing the historical loss rates. Banks can set aside 
reserves for those expected losses, e.g. loan-loss reserves, to absorb the losses. But 
there are some losses are greater than usual, we call these above average losses are 
unexpected losses, the regulatory capital are meant to cushion such a unexpected 
losses. In order to estimate the unexpected losses, four inputs are needed: (1) 
Probability of default (DP) (2) Loss given default (LGD) (3) Exposure at default 
(EAD) (4) Maturity of the asset: (Bessis, 2010)  
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Banks use these four inputs to estimate the unexpected losses, thus ensure to set aside 
a minimum capital equal to 8% of this amount. 
 
2.3.2 Basel III 
 
In September, 2010, The BCBS published Basel III in the response to Global financial 
crisis. The Basel III does not replace the Basel II, According to Bank of International 
Settlement, the aims to Basel III is to LPSURYHWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU¶VDELOLW\WRDEVRUE
losses from the financial and economic distress without affecting the rest of the 
economy.  
 
To be more specific, the structure of the three Pillars is unchanged, For the Pillar 1, 
Basel III retains the tier 1 and tier 2 capitals, but claims the composition of those two 
capitals should have a greater quality thus can better to absorb the losses. Under the 
Basel III, tier 1 must be the primarily RI ³FRUH FDSLWDO´ ZKLFK LQFOXGHV WKH HTXLW\
stock and retained earnings. Furthermore, some items in Basel II formerly included in 
DEDQN¶VFDSLWDOFDOFXODWLRQwill not TXDOLI\DV³FDSLWDO´any more in Basel III and will 
EHSKDVHGRXWRIWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIEDQN¶VFDSLWDOLQDWHQ\HDUVSHULRGVWDUWLQJLQ\HDU
2013. On one hand, Basel III increase the quality of the capital, on the other hand, it 
increases the amount of the capital banks have to hold. The regulated countries are 
expected to fully implement Basel III in 2019, and the total capital ratio will expect to 
10.5%, 2% increased compared with the 8% capital requirement under Basel II. Basel 
III requires bank have to keep the amount of tier 1 capital ratio at 6% of risk-weighted 
assets. Furthermore, banks must hold more core capital. ³Core capital´ is a kind of 
tier 1 capital which consists of common equity, therefore it represents the highest 
quality capital. Basel III require the bank have to hold the core capital equal to 4.5% 
of total risk-weighted assets, whereas the core capital only represent 2% of total 
risk-weighted assets on the previous Basel Accords. 
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Chapter 3:  Literature Review 
 
3.1 Economic theory of Credit risk 
 
Basically, credit risk is part of market risk, it shares the most same channels followed 
by other forms of market risks and also operates through other mechanism. But there 
are still some of distinctions between market risk and credit risk, for example, there 
are illiquid contracts for which market prices are not available. In this section, we 
focus on the economic principles of the credit risk.  
 
3.1.1 Adverse Selection 
 
Suppose in the business of lending, the borrower are expected to know more than the 
lenders, e.g. banks, about the credit characteristics of themselves, banks then will at 
an informational disadvantage condition. According to the FitzRoy,F (1998), 
asymmetric information exists when on a agreement, at least one party has better 
information than others are lacking in some dimension of the agreement. If one party 
to a contract has private information, when at the negotiation time, it is potentially can 
reduce the value of the contract to the other one due to the information asymmetry, 
such situation is called adverse selection.  
 
According to Darrough and Stouhton (1986), they conclude that under the adverse 
selection, the borrower has more information than the banks, such an information gap 
before sign the actual loan contract may ultimately affect the diagnosis of the credit 
risk for banks. Berndt and Cupta (2009) indicated that compared with the already 
established borrowers, new credit relationships have a higher probability of the 
adverse selection, the banks have more unobservable information for the new 
borrowers.  
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Banks attempt to compensate such potential risk by increasing the interest rate of 
borrowers or schedule the borrowing rate increases with the size of loans. But some 
borrowers still willing to pay the loan with a higher interest rate, they privately 
conscious that even with the high interest rate, it is still attractive with their poor 
credit quality. A high interest rate compensates the effect of the adverse selection, in 
the meanwhile, it means almost no borrower finds a loan attractive and the banks 
would not make profit.  
 
Based on the variation in credit risk over the population of the borrowers, limit access 
to credit seems more effective, although the adverse selection could still occur on 
some level, the banks can make profit on average, which based on the distribution of 
default risk and private information in the population of borrowers. According to such 
principle, banks will have a limit profits by setting a smaller quantitative exposure 
limits while a lager limit will encourage adverse credit quDOLW\7KHUHIRUHDQ³RSWLPDO´
limit is important which can trades off these two effects for banks. Furthermore, the 
quantitative limits should be based on information available on the credit quality.  
 
3.1.2 Moral Hazard 
 
$FFRUGLQJ WR )HOL[  ³0RUDO KD]DUG RFFXUV ZKHQ RQH SDUW\¶V DFWLRQV DUH
LPSHUIHFWO\ REVHUYDEOH DQG DIIHFW WKH YDOXH RI WKH H[FKDQJH WR RWKHU SDUWLHV´ ,W LV
obviously to see that the information asymmetry is the backbone of the moral hazard. 
7KHWHUP³0RUDO+D]DUG´GHULYHGIURPWKHLQsurance industry and used for describe 
the situation where, once the individual is insured against certain risk , the insured 
ZLOO SXW OHVV HIIRUW WR DYRLGLQJ WKH VDPH ULVNV )RU WKH EDQN¶V OHQGLQJ DFWLYLWLHV
informational advantages may enable borrowers engage in the activities that are 
XQGHVLUDEOH IURP WKH OHQGHU¶V YLHZ EHFDXVH VXFK DFWLYLWLHV ZLOO PDNH WKH ORDQ OHVV
likely to repaid then harm the interest of the lender.  
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For the banks, normally large loans are expected to be more risky than small loans, 
one reason is due to the moral hazard problem, it induce the borrower with larger 
loans have incentives to undertake riskier behaviour. The U.S. savings-and-loan 
debacle in 1980s, which is a consequence of the savings-and-loan institution can 
access to extensive credit under federal deposit insurance, on the other hand, without 
sufficient limits on the riskiness of savings-and-loan investments encouraged some 
savings-and-loan owners to take on more risky assets. Pennacchi (1998) indicated that 
the information asymmetries especially for the moral hazard problem arises due to 
banks are lack of implement expensive monitoring and screening process. 
Furthermore, the 2008 Global financial crisis which is originated from the U.S 
subprime mortgage market, has a worldwide effect on many banks, for the purpose of 
maintaining the stability of financial market, the European Central Bank provided 131 
billion dollars of extra funds to the money market (Anonymous, 2007a). It is arguable 
whether such a bailout from the central government is correct or not.  
 
3.2 Credit risk measurement 
 
In the past three decades, revolutions for the credit risk measurement techniques have 
been taken place. As credit risk measurement is a key component in a bank¶s risk 
management process, the traditional and modern credit measurement techniques will 
be briefly discussed in this chapter to make a deeper understanding of credit risk., 
  
3.2.1 Traditional credit risk measurement model 
 
Experts system 
 
$OPRVW\HDUVDJRPRVWRI ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQVUHOLHGVROHO\RQµH[SHUW¶ systems 
based on subjective analysis to the credit risk of the corporate loans assessment. To 
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reach such a subjective judgments, the banker should weighting of certain key factors, 
a classical  H[SHUW V\VWHP LV WKH ILYH ³&V´ V\VWHP WKH H[SHUW analyze these factors 
which related to the counterparty and market, subjectively weights them, finally 
UHDFKHVDFUHGLWGHFLVLRQ7KHVHILYH³&V´DUH: (Saunders and Allen, 2002) 
 
1. Character, which describes the reputation of the debtor, the willingness to pay 
and past repayment records. 
2. Capital, which describes the equity contribution of owners and its leverage 
ratio. 
3. Capacity, which describes the ERUURZHU¶V repayment ability, and the volatility 
of earnings.  
4. Collateral. In the event of default, a banker has claims on the collateral 
pledged by the borrower. 
5. Cycle (or Economic) Conditions, which indicates the status of the economic 
conditions.   
 
The subjective weights based on the five ³Cs´ systems by an expert can vary from 
different borrowers, this is due to such a system are considerable subjective and 
arbitrary, there is no standard criteria for the optimal weights for the borrowers. This 
makes the evaluation of the credit risk is lacking of the consistency. Not surprisingly, 
financial institutions have increasingly moved away from the expert systems over the 
past 30 years. 
 
Credit-scoring system 
 
Credit scoring systems can be applied to analysis any types of credit, from consumer 
credit to commercial loans. The idea of the credit-scoring system is that pre-identify 
certain key factors which can be used as determination of the probability of default, 
then weight them into a quantitative score. The score represents the probability of 
GHIDXOW3'RIDERUURZHU¶VULVNPHDVXUH,IWKHVFRUHZLWKLWVDWWDLQHGYDOXHLVhigher 
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than a critical value, a loan applicant is either rejected or subjected to increased 
scrutiny. In some cases, the score can be literally interpreted as a probability of default. 
In others, the score can be used as a classification system, it can put the borrowers 
into the different risk levels based on a score and correspond critical value. 
 
There are at least four methodological forms of multivariate credit-scoring models: (1) 
the linear probability model, (2) the logit model, (3) the probit model, and (4) the 
discriminant analysis model. Altman (1968) suggested one of the most famous 
credit-scoring models, the Z-score model, which is a classificatory model for 
corporate borrowers. The equation below shows the best-fitting model for commercial 
loans: 
 D? ൌ  ?Ǥ ?D?ଵ ൅  ?Ǥ ?D?ଶ ൅  ?Ǥ ?D?ଷ ൅  ?Ǥ ?D?ସ ൅  ?Ǥ ?D?ହ 
 
Where D?ଵ= working capital/total assets ratio; D?ଶ= retained earnings/total assets ratio; D?ଷ= earnings before interest and taxes/ total assets ratio; D?ସ= market value of equity/book value of total liabilities ratio; D?ହ= sales/total assets ratio. 
 
II WKH ILUP¶V =-score below the critical value, which in Altman (1968) initial study, 
1.81, the firm have a high probability of default then will be classified aV³EDG´DQG
the loan would not permit to grant, if the Z-score higher than 2.99, then the firm has a 
ORZ SUREDELOLW\ RI GHIDXOW  7KH YDOXH EHWZHHQ  DQG  LV WKH ³]RQH RI
LJQRUDQFH´ =-value in this area cannot be effectively judged. (Altman, 1968) 
However, the choice of the optimal cut-off point can be adjusted with the fluctuation 
of economic conditions, e.g. if the economy is expected to during a recession period, 
the cut-off point could be raised so that the probability of granting bad loans will be 
decreased. This reduces the PRGHO¶VW\SHHUURU, which is lending to bad customers, 
but incrHDVHV WKH PRGHO¶V W\SH  HUURU, which is the likelihood that good customers 
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will be denied credit (Saunders and Allen, 2002).  
 
A number of limitations for the credit-scoring system should be paid more attention 
here. Firstly, the model is linear while the path to bankruptcy may be highly nonlinear. 
Secondly, this model is essentially based on the accounting ratios, in terms of the 
market value of equity in the leverage ratio, most of countries use accounting data 
which only measured at incountinuous intervals and are generally based on the 
historical or book-value accounting principles, it is questionable whether the model 
can pick up a firm that is in deteriorating process.  
 
3.2.2 Modern credit risk measurement model 
 
Unlike with the traditional credit risk measurement, modern credit modelling 
techniques can be better adapted to the changes of the markets. Such modern credit 
risk modelling includes KMV-Merton Model, CreditMetrics model, CreditPortfolio 
View model, Creditmodel and CreditRisk+ model.  
 
CreditMetrics model 
 
Credit Metrics model was first published in 1997 by JP Morgan, the model uses the 
Value at Risk (VaR) to evaluate and assess the risk of loans, and such an approach is 
based on the credit migration analysis, e.g. the probability of one credit quality 
moving to another, it also includes default, for a specific time horizon. Therefore, the 
core idea of this approach is the value of risk is not only affected by the default of the 
creditor, it also influenced by the risk rating changes in the following year. 
CreditMetrics simulate the full forward distribution of the values of any loan or bond 
portfolio, e.g. 1 year forward, the changes in values are only related to the credit 
migration. Then Credit-VaR is gotten from similar method as for market risk, it is 
simply the percentile of the distribution for a given time period at a given confidence 
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interval, which reveals the maximum possible credit assets loss.  
 
The CreditMatrics model should be used with a specified rating system, the rating 
system should include the different rating categories, the probability of migrating 
from one credit quality to another. Due to the CreditMatrics approach only depends on 
the credit migration, a transition matrix will be the key component of this model. The 
WUDQVLWLRQ PDWUL[ FDQ EH 0RRG\¶V 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU¶V RU WKH EDQN¶V SULYDWH internal 
credit risk rating system. Table 3.1 is a transition matrix provided by Standard & Poor 
credit rating agency.  
 
Table 3.1 Standard & Poor transition matrix (within 1 year) 
Initial  Rating at year-end (%)  
rating AAA  AA A BBB  BB B CCC Default 
AAA 90.81 8.33 0.68 0.06  0.12 0 0 0 
AA 0.70 90.65 7.79 0.64  0.06 0.14 0.02 0 
A 0.09 2.27 91.05 5.52  0.74 0.26 0.01 0.06 
BBB 0.02 0.33 5.95 86.93  5.30 1.17 1.12 0.18 
BB 0.03 0.14 0.67 7.73  80.53 8.84 1.00 1.06 
B 0 0.11 0.24 0.43  6.48 83.46 4.07 5.20 
ccc 0.22 0 0.22 1.30  2.38 11.24 64.86 19.79 
Source:  6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶VCredit Week (15 Apr, 1996) 
 
As Aver (2008) stated, a good risk measurement should consider the link between the 
market and credit risk. According to the CreditMetric technical document, bank credit 
risk may be affected by the systematic risk, which reflected in changes in interest 
rates, stock index, exchange rates and unemployment status, etc. But by using a 
CreditMetrics model it assumes there is no market risk, therefore the only uncertainty 
in CreditMetrics is the credit migration. Under this method, the credit risk is 
independent to the market risk. Furthermore, the credit rating for bond evaluation is 
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based on a strong assumption made by CreditMatricsis that all issuers are 
credit-homogeneous within the same rating class, as well as the same probabilities for 
transition and default, e.g. MoRG\¶VWUDQVLWLRQPDWUL[DUHEDVHGRQPRUHWKDQ\HDUV
of history of firm, the data is obviously represent average statistics across a sample of 
heterogeneous firms in different business cycles. For this reason, some big banks 
prefer to use their own statistics which can be more closed to their loan and portfolios, 
but for some smaller banks, which cannot easy to access those data, have to rely on 
the credit rating agencies, the measurement of the credit risk may be biased.  
 
KMV model  
 
KMV model, which LVEDVHGRQ0HUWRQ¶VRSWLRQSULFLQJWKHRU\Zas published by the 
KMV Corporation in 1993. 
 
Compared with CreditMatrics model, which is relies on two important assumptions: 
first, firms within same credit rating share the same default rate. Second, the actual 
default rate is same with the historical average default rate. In other words, it means 
the credit rating is same with the default rate. This viewpoint is challenged by KMV. 
It is true for that the default rates are fluctuates over time, but it will take time for 
credit rating agencies to adjust the companies default rate when it has changed, 
therefore such a process is incontinuous. KMV conducted a simulation exercise and 
indicates that the actual default rate is significantly different with the historical 
average default rate. Furthermore, KMV has indicated that even for the same bond 
rating class it still has substantial differences in the default rates, e.g. some BBB and 
AA rated bonds share the same default probability.  
 
KMV model calculate the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) for each debtor based 
RQ WKH 0HUWRQ¶V W\SH PRGHO RI HDFK ILUP WKHUHIRUH WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI GHIDXOW LV D
IXQFWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH WKH asset return fluctuations and the current 
DVVHWYDOXH,IWKHILUP¶VDVVHW is higher than its matured liability, then the firm has an 
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incentive to repay the loan, while if the market value of the assets cannot exceeds its 
matured liability, the firm may have incentive to default. The KMV model computes 
EDF based on the fluctuatiRQV RI WKH FRXQWHUSDUW\¶V VWRFN SULFH WKHQ JHW WKH ORVV
given default (LGD) through EDF. 
 
KMV model can be divided into three main steps, firstly, estimate the market value 
and volatility of corporate equity based on the Black-Scholes options pricing formula. 
Secondly, based on the book value of the company liabilities, KMV model can 
calculate the default exercise point and distance default (DD). DD can be calculated 
as: 
 D?D?ൌ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D? െ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D? ൈ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D? 
 
DD includes three main components UHODWHGWRFUHGLWULVNWKHILUP¶VDVVHWVYDOXHWKH
business and industry risk of the firm, and its leverage. Furthermore, DD also involves 
the asset value and volatility, the effects of industry, geography and the size of firm 
(Crouhy, et al., 2000). 
 
CreditRisk+ model 
 
CreditRisk+ model was published by Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP) in 
1997. CreditRisk+ model only focuses on default probability and default loss. It 
assumes that default for individual bonds and loans are following a Poisson process 
(Crouhy, et al. 2000). In this model, it is assumed that: 
 
1. For a loan over a given period, e.g. 1 quarter, the default probability do not 
changed for other quarters.  
31 
 
2. For a large number of debtors, the probability of default for any specific 
debtor is small and the number of defaults in not correlated with the number of 
defaults in any other period.  
 
Therefore, these two assumptions assume that the probability of default is random for 
each loan in the credit portfolio and there is no correlation between any two loans.  
 
According to the risk exposure, CreditRisk+ divides credit portfolio into several 
bands with the level of exposure in each bank being approximated by a single number. 
The expected loss is calculated by average number of defaults times the risk exposure. 
The Actual Loss is calculated by the number of actual defaults times the risk exposure. 
Then the loss distribution for each bond will be obtained by combing the default loss 
and the default probability. After adding the loss distribution of each bond, the loss 
distribution of credit portfolio can be obtained.  
 
As the CreditRIsk+ only focus on default, and it only requires few inputs, e.g. the 
probability of default and the exposure. Thus it is easy to implement. On the other 
hand, CreditRisk+ has its limitations as well, the model assumes no market risk, 
which is similar with CreditMetrics and KMV models. Furthermore, CreditRisk+ 
ignores the migration risk, therefore the exposure of each obligor is constant and does 
not depend on the changes in credit quality and fluctuations of the future interest 
rates.  
 
CreditPortfolio View 
 
As Crouhy, et al. (2000) stated, CreditPortfolioView model is a multi-factor model to 
simulate the joint conditional distribution of default and migration probabilities for 
different rating groups in different countries. According to Ewing (2003), Bonfirm 
(2009), the business cycle has a significant impact on credit rating transition matrix. 
Therefore the distribution should be conditional on the value of macroeconomic 
32 
 
factors like the employment rate, the GDP growth rate, the level of long-term interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates, government expenditures and the aggregate savings rate, 
this is because the state of economy is driven by the macroeconomic factors in a large 
extend. So this model applies best to speculative grade obligor. 
 
CreditPortfolioView considers the links between the economy and the casual 
observation that default probabilities, as well as migration probabilities. When the 
economy declines both downgrades and defaults increase, it is the contrary when the 
economy booms. 
 
3.3 Literature review for credit risk determinants 
 
In the previous studies, there have two main trends that the potential factors impacts 
on the bank credit risk. One trend is most studies focus on the influence of 
macroeconomic environment on the credit risk, another trend is focus on the effect of 
the bank-specific factors as potential determinants of the credit risk. This section will 
discussed either of those two trends.  
 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic determinants  
 
GDP Growth Rates 
 
A majority of studies states that the banks risks are creating from both economic and 
business cycle. As business and economic conditions is worsening during the 
recession period, the bank will be more risky than before. During the boom periods, 
the economic activities are increasing and the volume of cash held for both business 
DQG KRXVHKROGV LV LQFUHDVLQJ WKLV FRQGLWLRQ FDQ SURPRWH WKH ERUURZHU¶V UHSD\PHQW
ability and then the credit risk of banks can be reduced.  
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Most studies use GDP growth rates as the main indicator of macroeconomic 
conditions. A decrease in GDP growth rates can be seen as an decline in income and 
the decreased debt servicing ability of borrowers.Koch and McDonald (2003) suggest 
that both borrowers and lenders are confident about the investment and ability to 
repay the loans during the good economic conditions.  
 
Salas and Saurina (2002) in their report compared the determinants of problem loans 
between the commercial and saving banks in Spain during the period from 1985 to 
1997 , based on a panel data approach the results indicates that the GDP growth rate 
are negatively affects the problem loans ratio in both commercial and saving banks. A 
similar result was obtained by Das and Ghosh (2007), they use advanced panel data 
techniques to examine the factors include both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
variables affecting problem loans of Indian state-owned banks during the period 1994 
to 2005, and the findings indicate that an acceleration of GDP leads to a decline in 
problem loans. The study conducted by Zribi and Boujelbene (2011) and Daly and Ali 
(2010) also found the same results which GDP growth has a negatively relationship 
with the growth of non-performing loans.   
 
On the other hand, Jimenez and Saurina (2006) found that the relationship between 
the economic cycle and bank risk is dialectical. Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) found 
there has no significantly impact of GDP growth on the credit risk. Fofack (2005) and 
Aver (2008) found the similar results.  
 
Inflation Rate 
 
Inflation rate is another macroeconomic factor can be considered as a potential 
determinant impact WKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN level. Inflation can depreciates the value of 
money then reduces the rate of return of the bank. Normally, high inflation rate will 
lead to a high loan interest rate, since inflation reduces the future value of money, it 
makes people try to forecast inflation, according to the forecast, banks will adjusting 
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their interest rate in order to compensate the losses brought by the inflation, if the 
inflation is not anticipated, the cost of banks may increase faster than bank revenue 
and then adversely affect the profitability of bank, furthermore, a high inflation rate 
ZLOO LQFUHDVH WKH REOLJDWLRQ RI WKH ORDQ ERUURZHUV DQG ILQDOO\ LQFUHDVH WKH EDQN¶V
credit risk.  
 
Gunsel (2008) examined the factors affect the bank fragility in the North Cyprus 
economy with a panel data contains 24 commercial banks from 1984 to 2008, the 
results shown that WKHLQIODWLRQUDWHLVSRVLWLYHO\UHODWHGWRWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN. The 
same results is founded by Rinaldi and Sanchez-Arellano (2006), their study examine 
the impacts of inflation to credit risk in North Cyprus and Euro Zone country. In an 
opposite side, Zribi and Boujelbene (2011) in their study which investigate the factors 
influence the bank credit risk in Tunisia banking sector and found that the inflation 
rate has a negative impact on the credit risk. The same results founded by Vogiazas 
and Nikolaidou (2011), Shu (2002) and Rinaldi and Sanchez-Arellano (2006) 
However, Castro (2012) did not found any significant influence of inflation to credit 
risk.  
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Unemployment rate is a crucial indicator to reflect the economic conditions. When the 
number of jobs available in the labor market is insufficient to everyone, the 
unemployment problem will be increased (Mankiw, 2002). Normally during the 
periods of economic downturn, a relatively high unemployment rate will appear at the 
same time. As the unemployment rate increased, which means the labor market is 
saturated, it should has a negatively impacts on the cash flow streams of households 
thus finally reduce their loans repayment ability. For the firms, the increases in 
unemployment conditions indicate that a decrease in production due to the reduction 
in effective demand, this may lead to a decrease in revenues then lead to a weak debt 
condition. Louzis et al. (2011) find that the employment rate has a strong effect on the 
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level of nonperforming loans in the study of the determinants of non-performing loans 
in the Greek banking sector. Lawrence (1995) suggests due to the unemployment risk 
increased that the borrowers with low income have higher default probability in loans 
thus finally lead them cannot settle their obligation. Rinaldi and Sanchez-Arellano 
(2006) argue that the probability of default depends on current income and the 
unemployment rate, which is linked to the uncertainty regarding future income the 
lending rates. 
 
Market Interest Rate 
 
7KHLQWHUHVWUDWHFDQEHWDNHQDVDQRWKHUGULYHURIEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNVLQFHLWDIIHFWVWKH
debt burden. 7KHFKDQJLQJDQGIOXFWXDWLRQRI WKHLQWHUHVWUDWHLV LPSRUWDQW WREDQN¶s 
credit risk because it influences the difficulty of borrowers to servicing the debt. For 
the borrowers, a rise in interest rate will directly increase the return of newly made or 
variable interest loans, then it will result in a debt burden increase, for the banks, it 
will lead to a high rate of nonperforming loans (Aver, 2008). According to the 
economic theory of asymmetric information theories, higher interest rates will 
intensify the adverse selection problem, as some borrowers still willing to pay the 
loan with a higher interest rate, they privately conscious that even with the high 
interest rate, it is still attractive with their poor credit quality. 
 
Richard (1999) examine determinants of bank failures in the US over the period 1963 
to 1991, the results show that there is a significant positive relationship between real 
interest rate which is measured by three-year Treasury notes minus inflation rate. The 
same result was founded by Fofack (2005), in his study which investigates the causes 
of nonperforming loans during the banking crises in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, 
empirical analysis shows that the real interest rate is significantly positive related with 
WKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWUisk. This suggests that the rising interest rate to the extent that the 
LQFUHDVHRIWKHFRVWRIGHSRVLWVDQGWKHQFRQWULEXWHGWRDGHFUHDVHLQWKHEDQN¶VSURILW 
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Exchange Rate fluctuation 
 
Exchange rate is also one of macroeconomic debates in the developing market, 
according to the Zammer and Siddiqi (2010), the fluctuation of the exchange rate is 
RQHRI WKHPDLQUHDVRQVRI WKHHFRQRPLF LQVWDELOLW\7KHERUURZHU¶VDELOLW\ WR UHSD\
the loans is sensitive to the exchange rate. Exchange rate measures the relative worth 
of the domestic currency in terms of another. (Zammer and Siddiqi 2010). For the 
firms, the main problem is the regularly appreciation of foreign currencies compared 
with the local currency, another is the difficulty in retaining native customers due to 
the price of imported goods and services increasing then finally affect the price of the 
final products which sold locally. (Sirpal, 2009) As the domestic price of foreign 
exchange rate rises, it becomes more expensive to acquire foreign product and 
services and then require more units of domestic currency to buy same quantity of 
products and services than before. The consequence is an increase in the demand for 
bank credit to support finances for covering the additional expenditure which resulted 
E\ H[FKDQJH UDWH GHSUHFLDWLRQ 1JHUHER  WKHQ UHGXFH WKH ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\
7KHUHGXFHLQILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\FDXVHWKHILUPIDFHWKHSUREOHPWRVHUYHWKHLQWHUHVW
and principal of debt.  
 
Zribi and Boujelbene (2011) conducted study in Tunisia banking sector and used ratio 
of risk weighted assets to total assets as proxy of credit risk then found there is a 
negative relationship between the exchange rate and credit risk. The same results was 
founded by Castro (2013), the study found the real effective exchange rate is 
negatively related to the credit risk. On the other hand, Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) 
in their study which investigates the relationship between foreign exchange volatility 
and credit, and found the relationship is ambiguous, no significant relationship. 
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3.3.2 Bank-Specific Determinants 
 
Even though some of the banks can be subjected to the same macroeconomic 
conditions in one country generally not all of them have exposed to a same level 
FUHGLWULVNWKHDSSURSULDWHDQGHIIHFWLYHEDQN¶VPDQDJHPHQWFDQVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHGXFH
WKH EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN WKXV DQRWKHU WUHQG LV IRFXV RQ WKH EDQN-specific factors as 
SRWHQWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRIEDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN7KHVH IDFWRUVPLJKW LQFOXGH as follows: 
WKHUHJXODWRU\FDSLWDOUDWLROHYHOEDQN¶VSURILWDELOLW\VRXUFHVRIIXQGVDQGWKHQDWXUH
of the ownership, etc.  
 
Ownership structure of the bank 
 
A large amount of literatures emphasize the ownership structure play an important 
role in affecting the credit risk of the bank, especially the relationship QDWXUHRIEDQN¶V
RZQHUVKLS DQG WKH EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN OHYHO. Generally, the State-owned banks are 
expected to take more risks than the private and foreign banks. (Zribi and Younes)As 
Li (2011) states that in the reality, banks normally has less incentive to manage credit, 
especially for the government banks, this is because the State-owned banks surely 
believe that they would be bailed out by government when bankruptcy occurs so that 
there have less incentives for them to manage the credit risk. Furthermore, according 
to Sapienza (2004) concludes the reasons into three aspects for why state-owned 
banks are exposed to take more risks than others types commercial banks. From the 
social view,the state interferes aims to correct the market failure brought by public 
banks. From the political view, the state-owned banks can be used to pursuing 
SROLWLFLDQ¶VSULYDWH LQWHUHVWV7KH WKLUG UHDVRQ LV WKDW DFFRUGLQJ WR WKHDJHQF\YLHZ
the author point out that the state-owned banks are plagued by corruption and 
resource misallocation. 
 
)XQJiþRYi DQG 6RODQNR  check into the relationship between bank specific 
features and risk-taking using quarterly data during the 1999-2007 on all Russian 
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banks and found that the effect of different ownership structure has a significant 
influence on the banks insolvency risk. De Nicolo (2001) suggests that the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH RZQHUVKLS DQG EDQNV¶ LQVROYHQF\ ULVN LV SRVLWLYH
According to the Boudriga, et al (2009), their study empirically analyses the 
cross-countries determinants of nonperforming loans and the empirical results 
indicate that foreign ownership has positive impact on loan quality because it can 
promotes imports of human capital, management skills and technologies, furthermore, 
it also can provides opportunity to raise funds cheaply on international markets, the 
authors also indicate that State banks have more incentives to involve in risky projects 
GXHWRWKHµWRRELJWRIDLO¶SUREOHP0icco and Panizza (2004) investigated how bank 
ownership affect bank performance in developing countries and found that the 
state-owned bank have higher ratio of nonperforming loans. Furthermore, as Maechler, 
et al. (2007) compares the different types of financial risks impacts on the bank 
stability , the result indicates that the foreign banks tend have a higher risk profile 
than the domestic banks. 
 
Bank Size 
 
%DQN¶VGLYHUVLILFDWLRQPD\DOVREH UHODWHGZLWK WKH ORDQTXDOLW\$V Gas and Ghosh 
(2007) states that the larger banks have a more control ability for credit risk than 
smaller banks because the larger banks might be able to control credit risk better than 
the smaller banks since the diversification can lower the credit risk, since large banks 
normally have a larger amounts of the borrowers with variety kinds of businesses, 
according to the Modern Portfolio Theory, the diversification can lower the 
unsystematic risk.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that income sources and loan portfolio diversification can 
be lower the credit risk of banks effectively. First, involvement in operations not 
associated with credit risk taking, for example, payment transactions, broking, etc 
which can diversify the income resources, then allow banks to earn less risky income 
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thus reducing incentives to finance speculative projects. Secondly, banks can reduce 
the impaired loans through lend money to a widely range of borrowers. 
 
The study of Salas and Saurina (2002) analyze the determinants of problem loans and 
compared with commercial and savings banks in Spain from 1985 to 1997, the result 
found the relationship between bank size and nonperforming loans are negatively 
related, it indicates that larger banks have more diversification opportunities. Hu et al. 
(2004) analysis the relationship between the bank size and non-performing loans with 
a panel dataset includes 40 Taiwanese commercial banks during the period 1996-1999 
and found that the bank size has a negative influence on the non-performing loans the 
result support the views that larger banks have more resources and ability to improve 
the quality of loans. Rajan and Dhal (2003) also report the similar results.  
 
On the other hand, the moral hazard of too-big-too-fail can represent another view of 
the relationship between the bank size and credit risk. Large banks may take an 
H[FHVVLYHULVNWDNLQJWRVLQFHWKH\H[SHFWJRYHUQPHQWSURWHFWLRQLQFDVHRIDEDQN¶V
failure. (Stern and Feldman, 2004) Consequently, large banks may increase their 
leverage too much without more prudent consideration and finally extend loans to 
lower quality borrowers, finally reduce the loan quality.  
 
Regulation Capital 
 
A common belief is that higher capital requirements will lead to a higher stability of 
the banking sector and then result in a higher stability of the banks and will a lower 
levels of the EDQN¶VULVN (Zribi and Boujelbene, 2011)According to the Basel I and II, 
Banks have to hold a minimum regulatory capital ratio equal to 8 percent of their total 
risk weighted assets, therefore to avoid the bank failures and protect the rate of return 
RQGHSRVLWRU¶VIXQG 
 
It is widely accepted in literature that low capital ratio is associated with higher 
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SUREDELOLW\RIEDQNV¶GHIDXOWEHFDXVHWKLVPD\LQGXFHPDQDJHUVLQYROYHLQPRUHULVN\
SURMHFWV $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH µ0RUDO +D]DUG¶ K\SRWKHVLV SUHVHQWHG E\ Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), low-capitalization banks leads to an increase in non-performing 
loans, a thinO\FDSLWDOL]HGEDQNV¶PDQDJHUKDYHLQFHQWLYHVWRLQFUHDVHWKHriskiness of 
their loan portfolio. Berger and DeYoung (1997) found lagged capital (measured by 
equity capital to total assets) indicates various results for different types of banks. 
They found the lagged capital is significantly negatively related to credit risk in the 
thinly capitalized banks. The result indicates that banks with lower capitalized are 
expected to have a higher risk. The similar results was founded by Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992).  
 
However, Ahmad and Ahmad (2004) find an opposite result which the regulatory 
capital is negative related with the conventional banks credit risk but positively 
related with credit risk in Islamic banking.  
 
Management Quality and Bank Efficiency  
 
The relationship between credit risk and bank efficiency is ambiguous in the literature, 
there is no consensus relationship. On one hand, high values of cost efficiency 
indicators may reflect the reduction on resource allocated to the risk management 
process and monitoring of the borrowers, which will leads to a decrease in loan 
quality. According to the skimping hypothesis proposed by Berger and DeYoung 
 WKH µVNLPSLQJ¶ K\SRWKHVLV LQGLFDWH WKDW KLJK cost efficiency will lead the 
number of nonperforming loans increasing, this is because a trade-off will be existed 
between allocating resources for underwriting and monitoring loans and the measured 
cost efficiency, that means, banks with be more cost-efficient with less effort to ensure 
the a higher loan quality. The result will lead to a lifeful number of Non-performing 
loans in the long-run. 
 
On the other hand, low cost efficiency means low level and quality of bank 
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management, so that an increasing in the problem loans due to the bad management of 
loans lending. According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) ³EDG PDQDJHPHQW´ 
hypothesis indicates that low cost efficiency is positively related with the future 
non-performing loans increasing. Bad management implies poor skills in credit rating, 
collaterals appraisal and borrowers monitoring.  
 
Podpiera and Weill (2008) examine the causality between non-performing loans and 
cost efficiency to find whether either of these factors is significantly affect the bank 
faiOXUHV7KHUHVXOWVVXSSRUWWKH³EDGPDQDJHPHQW´ hypothesis and suggest that lower 
cost efficiency will increase the non-performing loans.  
 
Loan Loss Provision 
 
Loan loss provision is known as an expected loan losses control mechanism. The 
Basel Accord I defined the Capital is to cover the unexpected losses while the loan 
loss provision is cover for the expected losses. Banks set aside a higher level of loan 
loss provision can decrease the earning volatility and enhance the medium-term bank 
payment ability through anticipating the expected losses. On the other hand, as the 
banks willing to provision for loan losses can be supposed to a strong belief in the 
future performance of the bank and managers use it to signal the financial strength of 
their banks (Ahmad, et al., 1999). The level of provisioning can be considered as the 
general attitude of the bank toward risk control.  
 
Bikker and metzemakers (2004) investigated how business cycle is affected by the 
bank¶s loan provision behavior, the results indicate that banks make substantially high 
level of provisions to cover the high expected losses when in a economic downturn. 
Therefore, a higher level of provision reflects a high potential credit risk.   
 
Ahmed et al. (1998) used Loan Loss provision to Total Assets ratio as a proxy for the 
loan loss provision and found Loan Loss provision is significantly positive associated 
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with NPLs. Therefore, a higher Loan Loss Provision indicates an increase in credit 
risk and decline LQORDQTXDOLW\)LVKHU*XH\LHDQG2UWL]¶VILQGVVLPLODUUHVXOWV
which the Loan Loss Provision is positively related to risk. Even the economic 
environment and develop level of banking system is different, the Malaysian banks 
show a similar results as their Loan Loss Provision is significantly positive related to 
credit risk (Ahmad, 2003) 
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Chapter 4:  Methodology 
 
This chapter is to explain the research methodology of the research. The objective of 
this research is to examine the determinants of Chinese commercial banks¶ credit risk 
Therefore, this research will establish a quantifiable relationship between the selected 
H[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVDQGWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNWRDVVHVVWKLVDTXDQWLWDWLYHUHVHDUFK
will be conducted in this dissertation. In this chapter, the hypotheses are put forward 
based on the theoretical and empirical evidence, and justify the selection of variables 
and choice of estimation method,then develop the appropriate models to exam the 
determinants of credit risk of Chinese commercial banks. 
 
4.1 Research Econometric Model 
 
As mentioned above, a quantitative methodology is used to analysis the significance 
of the identified variables. The econometric model which will be employed for this 
stud\LVEDVHGRQWKH³3DQHOGDWD´RU³ORQJLWXGLQDO´VHWVIRUZKLFKHDFKEDQNZLOOEH
UHSUHVHQWLQJWKH³FURVV-VHFWLRQ´ZKLOHDOVREHGLYLVLEOHWKURXJKDWLPHOLQHNQRZQDV
³WLPH-sHULHV´ :RROGULGJH 012;p.10). Therefore, the basic econometric regression 
model in this research to examining the determinants of credit risk and the 
independent variables can be written as follows: 
 ୧ǡ୲ ൌ ȕ଴ ൅ ȕଵଵ୧ǡ୲ ൅ ȕଶଶ୧ǡ୲ ൅ ȕଷଷ୧ǡ୲ ൅ C?ȕ୬୬୧ǡ୲ ൅ İ୧ǡ୲ 
 
Where 
 ୧ǡ୲: Dependent Variable in time t for bank i 
ȕ଴: Constant term 
ȕଵto ȕ୬: Coefficient of independent variable 
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ଵ୧ǡ୲to ୬୧ǡ୲: Independent variable in time t for bank i 
İ୧ǡ୲: Error term in time t for bank i 
 
4.2 Estimation Techniques 
 
There are several types of panel-data regressions, Pooled Model, Fixed Effects (FE) 
or Random Effects, the application of which type of method depends on the different 
tests.  
 
4.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 
Ordinary Least Squares is one of the most popular methods of all the regressions. 
when putting all the data together without making any difference between cross 
section and time series, and the random errors were truly random, positive and 
negative value of error term would be randomly distributed across banks and years, 
the regression run over the dataset by using ordinary least squares will be pooled OLS 
regression. When use a pooled regression approach, it has several advantages. Firstly, 
the number of observations, degree of freedom can be increased, and it also can 
reduce the co-linearity problem between the explanatory variables especially there are 
limited numbers of observations. Secondly, pooling data can controlling the 
exogenous shocks common to all banks (time effects) and reduce the omitted variable 
effects (unit effects). Its applicability is explained under the umbrella of the Classical 
/LQHDU5HJUHVVLRQ0RGHO &/50ZKHUH LW LVDVVXPHGWKDW³UHJUHVVRUVDUH IL[HGRU
QRQVWRFKDVWLF LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKHLU YDOXHV DUH IL[HG LQ UHSHDWHG VDPSOLQJ´ DQG DUH
³KRPRVFHGDVWLF´ZKHUHWKHYDULDQFHIor the error term is deemed constant (Gujarati, 
2011). Given this GLRM assumptions, the OLS is the Best (Minimum Variance) 
Linear Unbiased Estimator under the Gauss-Markov theorem. 
  
However, in regression analysis when several explanatory variables are highly 
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correlated, the multicollinearity problem will affect the results of the regression model. 
It will have several symptoms for the multicollinearity problem: (1) when adding or 
deleting variable(s) or observation(s), there will be large changes in the regression 
coefficients. (2) The coefficient for a theoretical important explanatory variable will 
be insignificant, or comes with an opposite sign. (3) Even with a significant F statistic 
for whole regression and the R-square is quite high, the individual coefficients are 
insignificant (Koop, 2006). The variance-inflation factor (VIF) can be used to test the 
multicollinearity problem. As a rule of thumb, if the value of VIF exceeds 10, the 
dataset will consider have a multicolinearity problem (Wooldridge, 2012; p.94). 
 
Heteroskedasticity is a statistical problem occurring mainly in cross-section studies, 
because of different sizes of the units, e.g. the profit of large banks are likely to be 
higher than the profits of small banks, the variance of profits for large banks with a 
diversified loan portfolio is likely much lower than the smaller banks. Furthermore, 
the variance of dependent variable will increase as the measurement of the dependent 
variable gets larger. Thus as the data sample becoming more complicated it has a 
tendency to heteroskedasticity.  
 
Simple pooled regression may not be optimal to catch the relationships between 
dependent variable and explanatory variables. Due to the simple pooled model may be 
biased as it assumes no differences exist between units and it assumes there is no 
heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2012; p.444). If there are persistent differences between 
banks (individual heterogeneity), error term would vary more systematically across 
firms. E.g. some banks would have high proportion of positive values, while others 
would have more negative values. 
 
 
4.2.2 Fixed Effects Estimation 
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Consider the variant equation as follows: 
 ୧୲ ൌ ȕ୧୲ ൅ ୧ ൅ İ୧୲L «1W «7 
 
Estimating through equation 1 by OLS would be problematic since the heterogeneity 
term ୧ is likely to be correlated with x.  
 O?୧ǡ ୧O? ്  ? 
 
Here ୧ is called the fixed effect. The fixed effects estimator, which can uses a 
transformation to remove the heterogeneity term, through eliminate the fixed effect. 
 
Now for each I, average the equation over time as: 
 ୧ ൌ ȕ୧ ൅ ୧ ൅ İ୧୲ 
Where ୧ ൌ  ? ୷I?I?I?I?I?I?୘  and so on. 
 
Subtract 2 from 1 to eliminate ୧ then we can get the model as: 
 O?୧ ൌ ȕO?୧ ൅ O?୧୲W «7 
 
Where O?୧ ൌ ୧୲ െ ୧ is the time-demeaned data on y, and similar for O?୧andİO?୧୲. The 
fixed effects transformation is also called the within transformation. As the estimator 
is free of endogeneity bias since the correlated effects are elimated, a pooled OLS 
estimator based on the time-demeaned variables then is called fixed effects estimator 
or the within estimator (Wooldridge, 2012; p.467) 
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4.2.3 General Least Squares Estimation 
 
In the fixed effects model, the goal is to eliminate the fixed effects term because it is 
thought to be correlated with one or more explanatory variables. But if the fixed 
effects term is not correlated with each explanatory variable in all time period, using a 
transformation to eliminate the fixed effects term will results in inefficient estimators 
(Wooldridge, 2012; p474). Furthermore, when the variances of the observations are 
heteroscedasticity, OLS will be statistically inefficient and give the incorrect 
estimation. Instead, a generalized least squares (GLS) procedure is usually used. 
Generalized Least Squares can be used to estimate models with autoregressive serial 
correlation. The Random effect model, which is also known as the error component 
model, then is best estimated by Generalized Least Squares (GLS) instead of the OLS.  
 
4.3 The selection criteria of estimation techniques 
 
4.3.1 Random Effects Model or Pooled Model 
 
The differences between the Random effects model and pooled model is that the 
former model assumes there exists an individual heterogeneity across the units, while 
the latter one assumes there is no heterogeneity exists. In this research, we will use the 
Breusch-Pagan test to test for the presence of heterogeneity. The null hypothesis of 
WKLV WHVW VWDWHV WKDW ³WKHUH LV QR KHWHURJHQHLW\´ 6R UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH QXOO K\SRWKHVLV
would be evidence in the favor of the random effects model.  
 
4.3.2 Random Effects Model or Fixed Effects Model 
 
Models controlling such heterogeneity are called individual effects model-Fixed 
effects model (FEM) and Random effects model (REM), the key differences between 
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those two models is that the FE model assumes that the heterogeneity term is 
correlated with the independent variable, while the RE model assumes the correlation 
between the heterogeneity term and independent variable is zero.  
 
Due the presence of the heterogeneity across the banks, the fixed effects model and 
random effects model are better than the pooled model, therefore, to determine the 
choice between the fixed and random effects models is important issue in this 
research. If the individual effects (heterogeneity) and the regressors are uncorrelated, 
the random effects model is the best, while if the individual effects are correlated with 
the regressors, fixed effects model will be choose and never use the random effects 
model. To determine which model is more suitable for this research, the Hausman 
7HVWZLOOEHXVHG7KHQXQGHUWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVRI³WKHUHLVQRFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
UHJUHVVRUV DQG LQGLYLGXDO HIIHFWV´ LI WKH QXOO K\SRWKHVLV LV UHMHFWHG )L[HG (IIHFWV
model is applicable. The formula for the Hausman test statistic can be represented as: 
 D? ൌO?D?ிாெ െ D?ோாெO?ƍD?ିଵO?D?ிாெ െ D?ோாெO? 
 
Where,  
ȕ୊୉୑is the fixed effects model estimator 
ȕୖ୉୑is the random effects model estimator 
V: Variance (ȕ୊୉୑O? െ O?ȕୖ୉୑O? 
 
4.4 Variables and research models  
 
4.4.1 Dependent Variable  
 
Credit risk- Non-performing loans ratio 
 
49 
 
In order to investigate the credit risk determinants in Chinese banking sector, it is 
important to determine the measurement of the credit risk for this research. Based on 
the previous theoretical part, credit risk can be defined as a risk of loss arising from a 
borrower who does not make payments as promised, A non-performing loans can be 
those loans that in default or almost close to default. (Altman and suggitt, 2000) 
Therefore the Non-SHUIRUPLQJ ORDQV FDQ UHIOHFW WKH TXDOLW\ RI DVVHWV RI D EDQN¶V
portfolio.  
 
One of the most commonly logical indicators of credit risk is the ratio of 
non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans. As Peria and Schmukler (2001;p.1035.) 
stated, NPL ratio can be measures the percentage of loans a bank might have to write 
off as losses. There are several previous studies, Ahmad and Afiff (2007), use NPL 
ratio as the proxy of the credit risk, the same method can be found in Berger and 
DeYoung (1997).Then the credit risk can be represented as the following ratio:  
 O?O? ൌ 
 
 
IQ&KLQD¶VEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\ loans can be divided into five categories: normal, special 
mention, substandard, doubtful and loss loans. Non-performing loans includes the last 
three categories. A high NPL ratio refers to the more default and the higher credit risk 
for banks.  
 
4.4.2 Explanatory variables  
 
Gross Domestic Product Rate 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is regularly used by economists to measure the impact 
of aggregate economic activity. Hence the GDP growth can be considered as an 
important macroeconomic determinant of bank performance. A positive growth 
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indicates to economic booms, while a negative growth refers to the economy 
recession. During the recessions, the quality of loans decline due to the difficulty for 
ERUURZHUV¶UHSD\PHQW2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLQDSHULRGRIHFRQRP\ERRPVWKHJHQHUDO
economic activities are increase, thus the volume of cash flow for borrowers are 
increased then lead to an increase of repayment ability. Therefore, changes in the GDP 
are expected to have impact on the Chinese banking sector. There are two types of 
GDP, the real GDP and Nominal GDP. The real GDP growth rate which is an 
inflation-adjusted measure that refers the value of outputs in a given year is selected 
as a potential determinant in this research. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The real GDP growth rate is negatively related with the Chinese 
FRPPHUFLDOEDQNV¶FUHGLWULVN  
 
Inflation 
 
Inflation can depreciate the value of cash thus reduce the rate of return in general. For 
the banks, if the anticipation of inflation over a relevant period is fail and cannot 
adjust the interest rate to increase the revenue to compensate the negative impact of 
LQIODWLRQ WKLV ZLOO KDYH D QHJDWLYH HIIHFW IRU WKH EDQN¶V SHUIRUPDQFH )XUWKHUPRUH
inflation also give an incentive to invest, when inflation increasing, people prefer to 
take on more risk to invest, finally it will increase the default probability of the loans. 
(Qu, 2008). Moreover, according to the principal-agent theory, a decrease in profit as 
bank manager failing to anticipate the inflation will lead bank manager to take on 
extra risk and finally LQFUHDVHWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN  
 
The inflation measured by Consumer Prices (annual %) can indicates the annual 
percentage changes in cost to average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services,thus the Consumer prices (annual %)is used as a proxy for the inflation to 
reflect the fluctuations in inflation in this study.  
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Hypothesis 2: The inflation is positively related to the Chinese commercial 
EDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN 
 
Market interest rate 
 
The interest rate is a potential important factor which afIHFWVWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN$Q
increasing in interest rate may increase the debt burden for the borrowers. 
Furthermore, in terms of asymmetric information theories, higher interest rate will 
lead to an adverse selection and moral hazard problem. As stated by Stiglitz and Weiss, 
WKHLQFUHDVLQJRILQWHUHVWUDWHZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHULVNLQHVVRIEDQN¶VORDQSRUWIROLRIURP
either discouraging the safer investor or inducing the borrowers to take on more risky 
projects. In this research, Lending rate, the rate normally used by banks to meets the 
short-term and medium-term financing needs for the private sector, is selected as a 
potential determinant of the credit risk. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The interest rate is positively related with the bank¶s credit risk.  
 
Exchange rate 
 
The foreign exchange rate measures the relative worth of domestic currency to other 
FRXQWU\ ,W FDQ UHIOHFW D FRXQWU\¶V H[SRUW DQG LPSRUW FRQGLWLRQV $V WKH IRUHLJQ
currency value goes up, the price of imported inputs will goes up which will lead the 
final products with a lower price advantage for the domestic firms. Even though the 
international competitors this will lead a lower probability of default as the exporting 
cost will decrease, but for the Chinese banking sector, due to their major services are 
face for the domestic producers, the appreciation of foreign currency will lead the 
GHFUHDVHRIWKHGRPHVWLFILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\DQG WKHLUORDQUHSD\PHQWDELOLW\ILQDOO\
increase the probability of loans default. As US dollar is the predominant world 
currency in world trading activities, the exchange rate measured by direct quote for 
U.S dollar are used in this research. E.g. a direct quote for U.S dollar would be 6.12 
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Yuan= 1 dollar, thus a increase in exchange rate indicates a depreciation of local 
currency.  
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant negative relationship between the exchange 
UDWHDQGEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN  
 
Unemployment rate 
 
Compared with the GDP growth rate, which can be used as an indicator of the 
economic environment conditions, unemployment rate can give additional 
information for the regarding the economic conditions impacts (Castro, 2013). As the 
increase in the unemployment rate, it will indicate that more borrowers may lose their 
jobs thus provide a negative impact for their income, a decrease of cash flow streams 
of households and increasing in the debt burden. For firms, increases in 
unemployment reveals that the decrease in production as a result of dropping in 
effective demand. Those effects may lead the growth of bank default loans.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Unemployment rate is negatively related with the bank¶s credit 
risk.  
 
Bank Size  
 
7KHVL]HRIEDQNLVVXSSRVHGWREHUHODWHGWRWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN&RPSDUHGZLWKWKH
small banks, large banks have higher control ability for the credit risk as the 
diversified loan portfolios. According to the portfolio theory, a diversified portfolio 
can lower the unsystematic risk since large banks normally have a larger amount of 
the borrowers with variety kinds of business. Furthermore, with a variety of 
businesses, larger banks are involvement in operations not associated with credit risk 
taking, it allow banks to earn more stable income thus reducing incentives to take on 
more riskier activities, e.g. finance speculative projects.  
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Size is used to capture the economies of scale in the market. As the amount of assets 
varied differently with highly dispersed range across banks, most of studies use the 
natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy to measure the size of bank. Through using 
the natural logarithm, the size can be more homogeneous and easy to compare with 
others. 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ EDQN VL]H DQG EDQN¶V
credit risk.  
 
Regulatory Capital  
 
Banks and other financial institutions normally hold a range of asset and each type of 
assets has its own risk profile. E.g. under the Basel Accords II, mortgage loans which 
secured with collateral has a 50% weighting of Risk-weighted assets. Regulatory 
capital is used to cushion the unexpected losses for banks. In accordance with the 
Basel Accords I and II, banks should hold a minimum capital equal to 8% of their 
risk-weighted assets, while under the new Basel Accords, the ratio will increase to 
10.5% in 2019. Regulatory capital ratio consists of two parts. Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 
FDSLWDO ZKHUH WLHU  FRQVLVWV SULPDULO\ RI ³FRUH FDSLWDO´ 6XFK D UHJXODWRU\ capital 
requirement is to ensure the banks have enough capital to cushion the losses in order 
to meeting their obligations as usual. A higher regulatory capital means the bank have 
more capacity to absorb the unexpected losses, thus lead to a lower credit risk. In this 
research, the measurement of the Capital adequacy ratio is similar to Awojobi et al 
(2011) method, The ratio of capital adequacy was obtained from BankScope in the 
form as: 
  ൌ  ? ൅  ?  
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Hypothesis 7: The regulatory capital is negatively related to Chinese commercial 
EDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN  
 
Bank Efficiency 
 
Efficiency within a bank is important for the credit risk management, it requires banks 
create more values with a less spend on money. The relationship between the bank 
HIILFLHQF\DQGFUHGLWULVNLVDPELJXRXVLQSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVRQHWUHQGDVVXPHVEDQN¶V
put less effort to with less effort to ensure the loan quality will be more cost-efficient, 
thus there will be a lifeful number of non-performing loans in the long-run. Another 
trend is that, low cost efficient implies bad management and skills in appraisal and 
PRQLWRULQJ WKH ERUURZHUV WKXV OHDG WR LQFUHDVH WKH EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN +RZHYHU WKH
proxy for the bank management efficiency is adopt the method based on Zribi and 
Boujelbene (2011) and Awojobi et al. (2011), which are emphasizing on earning assets 
WRWRWDODVVHWVUDWLREDVHGRQ³PDQDJHPHQWGHFLVLRQVDIIHFWWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIDVVHWV
ZKLFK DUH HDUQLQJ KLJK LQWHUHVWV´ Angbazo (1997).The Return on Average Total 
$VVHWV52$$LVDSSOLHGDVDPRUHUDWLRQDOSUR[\IRUWKHPDQDJHPHQW¶VHIILFLHQF\ 
  ൌ  
 
0LVKLNLQ  VWDWHV WKDW ³ WKH return on assets reflects how efficiently a bank is 
being operated, because it describes the amount of profits are generated on average by 
HDFK GROODU RI DVVHWV´ In this study, we suppose the relationship between the bank 
efficiency and credit risk as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 8: The bank management efficiency is positively related to the 
&KLQHVHFRPPHUFLDOEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN 
 
Loan Loss Provision  
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Loan loss provision can be used to cover the expected loan losses. Banks anticipating 
the possible levels of capital losses, if the banks expect a growth in risk and 
deterioration in loan quality, banks will create more loan loss provisions. On the other 
hand, managers often use loan loss provisions as a signal to the financial strength,  
the willingness of a bank to set aside provision for loan losses signifies strong belief 
in the future performance of the bank (Ahmad et al.1999) In this research, to 
LQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHORDQORVVSURYLVLRQDQGEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNZH
adopt the approach from the Ahmad And Ariff (2007), use the loan loss provision to 
WRWDOORDQVUDWLRDVDPHDVXUHPHQWRIWKHEDQN¶VORDQORVVSURYLVLRQOHYHO 
 D?D?D?D? ൌD?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D? 
 
Hypothesis 9:  The Loan loss provision is positively related with the Chinese 
FRPPHUFLDOEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVk.  
 
4.4.2 Dummy Variables 
 
Bank Ownership  
 
To compare the state-owned commercial banks with other types commercial banks 
and investigate whether the state-owned banks will bear more credit risk, dummy 
variable will be used in this study. Dummy variables DUH ³HVVHQWLDOO\ D GHYLVH WR
FODVVLI\GDWDLQWRPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHFDWHJRULHV´*Xjarati and Porter, 2009; p.278). 
In econometrics, qualitative factors often come in the form of only two possible 
values, the relevant information can be captured by a binary variable. 
 
A large number of studies indicate that ownership structure might have a significantly 
impact on the credit risk of the banks. Generally, most of the studies indicate that the 
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state-owned banks take more risks than other types of banks. The fiUP¶VRZQHUVKLS
structure can be summarizedinto two main categories: the degree of ownership 
concentration and the nature of the owner (Iannota et al., 2007). In this research, we 
adopt the nature of the ownership to measure the ownership structure as the 
ownership concentration data is difficult to obtain in Chinese banking industry. Our 
dataset contains state-owned commercial banks, city commercial banks, joint-stock 
commercial banks and foreign commercial banks, we divided those banks into two 
dimensions, the state-owned commercial banks and others. Similar to the approach 
adopted by Cheng et al. (2013), the dummy variable OWN is introduced. OWN 
equals 1 if the bank is a state-owned commercial bank and zero otherwise.  
 
Hypothesis 10: State-owned banks will take on more risks than other W\SH¶V 
commercial banks in China.  
 
Global Financial Crisis 
 
As the 2008 financial crisis are expected to affect the global economy, one of the aims 
of this study is to investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis has animpact on the 
&KLQHVHFRPPHUFLDOEDQNV¶FUHGLWULVN  The dummy variable, GFC08, will beused to 
determine the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on Chinese commercial banks. 
Through use such a controlvariable to signify the period of the crisis, the dummy 
variable will take the value of 1 if the observations after year 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
 
As 2008 global financial affected the world economy. The unemployment rate reached 
10% in United States and caused a higher level in the Europe and elsewhere. In China, 
before the 2008 global financial crisis, the GDP growth rate reached an unprecedented 
high level in 2007, however, as the global financial crisis damage the Chinese 
exporting sector, which shown in the Figure 2.2, the portion of exports of goods and 
services to GDP decrease sharply from 34.98% in 2008 to 26.71% in 2009, most 
export-oriented companies will be affected by the reduction of demand. Furthermore, 
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compared with 2008, the real GDP growth rate slowed almost 5% in 2009. As we 
expected the downturn in economic condition should have a positive impact on the 
EDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNZKLFKUHVXOW LQ OLPLWHGLQ OLTXLGLW\ WKHQRQ-performing loans ratio 
should higher after 2008 global financial crisis in Chinese commercial banks Thus we 
H[SHFWHG D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH JOREDO ILQDQFLDO FULVLV DQG WKH EDQN¶V
credit risk. 
 
Hypothesis 11: 2008 Financial Crisis will has a positive relationship between the 
&KLQHVHFRPPHUFLDOEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Variables 
 
Variable Abbreviation Measurement  Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable  
Credit Risk NPL Non-Performing Loans (NPL) 
Ratio 
 
Independent variables  
- Macroeconomic  
 
GDP Growth  GDPr Real GDP Growth Rate (%) ൅ 
Inflation INF Consumer Prices annual (%) ൅ 
Interest Rate INR Lending Interest Rate ൅ 
Exchange Rate EXR Direct Quotation for US 
dollars 
 
Unemployment  UNR Unemployment Rate ൅ 
Independent variables   
- Microeconomic  
 
Bank Size SIZE Natural Logarithm of Total 
Assets 
െ 
Regulatory Capital CAR Total Regulatory Capital Ratio െ 
Bank Efficiency BKEF Return On Average Total 
Assets 
൅ 
Loan Loss Provision  LLP Loan Loss Provision to Total 
Loans Ratio 
൅ 
Dummy Variables  
State-Owned 
Commercial banks 
OWN 1 if state-owned banks, 0 
otherwise 
൅ 
2008 Global Financial 
Crisis 
GFC08 1 if observations after 2008, 0 
if observations before or 
൅ 
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during 2008 
 
Econometric Model 
 
For the purpose of formalize the applicable hypotheses, the above mentioned 
variables need to be summarized into an econometric model. Therefore, the equation 
of the model to be used in this research can be summarized as follows: 
 ୧୲ ൌ ȕ଴ ൅ ȕଵ
୲ ൅ ȕଶ	୲ ൅ ȕଷ୲ ൅ ȕସ୲ ൅ ȕହ୲ ൅ ȕ଺୧ǡ୲൅ ȕ଻୧ǡ୲ ൅ ȕ଼	୧ǡ୲ ൅ ȕଽ୧ǡ୲ ൅ ȕଵ଴୧ǡ୲ ൅ ȕଵଵ
	 ? ?୧ǡ୲ ൅ İ୧ǡ୲ 
 
4.5 Data  
 
To explore the determinants of credit risk empirical analysis in Chinese commercial 
banks, the data based on income statement and balance sheets of Chinese commercial 
banks is gathered from the FiWFK,%&$%XUHDXYDQ'LMN¶V%DQNScope database. The 
ownership information obtained from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the 
macroeconomic data are obtained from China Almanac of Finance. All the data are 
collected from year 2003 to 2013. However, due to some banks do not provide the full 
information for each variable. A selection criterion is adopted in this research. The 
final dataset is based on the following criteria: First, the banks with less than three 
consecutive years of observations have been deleted. Second, the observations with 
missing some values have been excluded from the dataset. The original dataset 
includes 200 active bank institutions from BankScope, however, the Chinese banking 
sector are heterogeneous across different groups, e.g. these institutions are subject to 
different regulations then the changes might cause instability in coefficient between 
different groups. In order to obtain more homogeneous group of banks, only 
commercial banks are considered in this research, The final dataset, which is a 
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unbalanced panel data, end up with a smaller sample, 64 commercial banks with 342 
bank-year observations are selected for this research. 
 
  
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values, No. of observations) for the dependent variable and explanatory 
variables. For the unexpected loss, under the Basel Accords, banks need set up capital 
at least equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets to cover the unexpected losses. For the 
total capital ratio, the average value for all banks is 12.88 percent, which is higher 
than the Basel I and II regulatory capital requirement, but the lowest value is 1.45 
percent which is much lower than the minimum 8% value, banks with an insufficient 
regulatory capital may cannot fulfill their obligation and finally have a bankruptcy 
risk. Furthermore, with an average value equal to 10.04 % of the real GDP growth 
rate and a Minimum value equal to 7.8%, it indicates that the Chinese economy has a 
sustainable economic growth in the past 10 years.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for the variables  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations 
NPL 1.972602 1.954409 0.01 13.14 342 
GDPr  10.04064 1.7211 7.8 14.2 342 
INF 3.162846 2.150137 -0.7029492 5.864384 342 
INR 5.955497 0.6260303 5.31 7.47 342 
EXR 6.947136 0.5868098 6.3125 8.277 342 
UNR 4.144737 0.0870758 4 4.3 342 
SIZE 18.79261 2.053174 15.15545 23.58788 342 
CAR 12.87614 5.275146 1.45 54.62 342 
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BKEF 1.001959 0.4721281 -0.48 3 342 
LLP 0.0245403 0.2077733 .0000397 3.224242 342 
OWN 0.122807 0.3286965 0 1 342 
GFC08 0.6520468 0.477019 0 1 342 
 
 
Table A-1 (See Appendix) describes the correlation matrix of the variables. If some 
or all of the explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another, a possible 
multicollinearity problem will be emerged. If there has a multicollinearity problem, 
the regression model will has difficulty to determine which of the explanatory 
variable(s) is influencing the dependent variable. The table above indicates the overall 
correlations between the variables are not strong except the correlation between LR 
and UNR with a -0.8334, but the correlation with other variables is weak.  However, 
a formal test, the variance-inflation Factor (VIF) test, to detect the multicollinearity 
among variables will be conducted in the following data analysis process.  
 
$V13/UDWLRFDQEHXVHGDVDSUR[\IRUEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNWKHIOXFWXDWLRQRIWKH13/
ratio reveals the movement of bank credit risk. Figure 4.1 describes the 
Non-performing loans changes in Chinese banking sector from 2003 to 2012. It can 
be clearly seen from the chart that the Non-performing loans in the state-owned banks 
account for the most of total non-performing loans of whole banking sector in China. 
Furthermore, Figure 4.2 demonstrates a downward trend for the Non-Performing 
loans ratio in Chinese banking industry, there is a downward trend for the NPL ratios 
for all three types NPL ratio from 2003 to 2012, the NPL ratio for both State-owned 
banks and the whole banking sector have a slightly rise between 2006 to 2007 while 
the other banks¶ NPL ratio had a slightly decrease. The differences between NPL ratio 
in other commercial banks and Total NPL ratios is  while there is not an obvious 
difference between the total NPL ratio and the ratio of State-owned commercial banks. 
The graph indicates that the trend of total commercial bank NPL ratio is consistent 
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with the state-owned commercial banks NPL ratio. It can be concluded that 
state-owned banks have a decisive impact on the NPLs performance in Chinese 
commercial bank market than other banks.   
 
Figure 4.1 Non-Performing Loans For Chinese Banking Industry from 
2003-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Non-Performing Loans Ratios for Chinese Banking Industry from 
2003 to 2012 
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Chapter 5:  Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
This chapter will demonstrate the relationship among each explanatory variable to the 
credit risk, which is measured by the Non-performing loans ratio, for Chinese 
commercial banks from 2003 to 2012. This part will analyze the results obtained from 
the regression models. 
 
Hypotheses 1-9 ± Credit risk (NPL) and the Independent variables 
 
As the hypotheses mentioned in the Table 4.1, the analysis in this section will focus 
on impact of the macroeconomic factors and microeconomic factors on Chinese banks 
credit risk, thus a model for those variables can be written as: 
 D?D?D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵD?D?D?D?௧ ൅ ଶD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ଷD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ସD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ହD㜇?D?௧ ൅ D?଺D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅D?଻D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?଼D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?ଽD?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?௜ǡ௧                           (Model 1) 
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After establishing the basis model for testing the hypothesis, inspect the existence of 
Multicolinearity and heteroskedasticity is an important step for analysis the research 
dataset. Even a simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression for model 1 with 
F-statistics (0.0000), which is an indicator of overall adequacy of the estimated model 
through testing the joint significance of the parameters, is significant less than 5%. it 
is more formal to use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to determine whether 
there has a multicolinearity problem. As mentioned in previous chapter, the value of 
10 is used as a threshold as rule of thumb for VIF statistic. VIF results are shown in 
the Table 5.1, the VIF is significantly lower than the critical value thus provides the 
evidence against multicolinearity problem.  
 
Table 5.1 VIF values for Model 1 
Independent Variables VIF 
GDPr 5.04 
UNR 4.29 
INR 4.08 
UNR 4.29 
EXR 4.01 
INF 1.61 
BKEF 1.26 
CAR 1.17 
SIZE 1.07 
LLP 1.06 
Mean VIF 2.62 
 
After checking for the Multicolinearity problem, to test the assumption of the 
disturbance term has constant variance for Classical Linear Regression model, the 
White¶s General Test is used to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity. Since the 
statistic value is larger and with is lower than 5% significance level (p=0.0150), thus 
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the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity can be rejected for model 1 and provide 
evidence for there might exist a heteroskedasticity problem. Afterwards, the Breusch 
and Pagan test, which is used to test the existence of individual heterogeneity is 
conducted, a robust evidence for the inappropriate for the OLS regression is provided 
as the null hypothesis of there is no heterogeneity is rejected. Due to the existence of 
heteroskedasticity and individual heterogeneity problem, a straightforward OLS 
regression becomes inappropriate for this model  
 
As suggested in the Chapter III, as using OLS is not feasible thus a GLS method for 
using either Random Effects or Fixed Effects model will be taken into account. To 
determine which model is more suitable, a Hausman test is conducted. As the P-value 
LVKLJKHUWKDQWKHVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOWKXVWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLV³UHJUHVVRUV
DQGHIIHFWVKHWHURJHQHLW\DUHQRWFRUUHODWHG´FDQQRWUHMHFWHGWKXVDUDQdom effects 
model is used in this section.  
 
Before analyze the results from model 1, there is an important element that need to be 
considered, which is the R-squared value. R-square statistics gives information about 
the goodness of fit of the model. R-square statistics with value of 0.4355 suggests that 
43.55% of the variability in NPL ratios can be explained by the independent variables 
in model 1.  
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Table 5.2 Random Effects Results for Model 1 
 
Determinants Coefficient Standard Error Nature of 
Correlation 
With NPL 
ratio 
GDPr -0.1327511 0.08683 Negative 
INR -0.4779932**   0.2100018 Negative 
INF 0.0850776** 0.038538 Positive  
EXR -1.84008*** 0.2529379 Negative 
UNR -3.991447*** 1.549784  Negative 
SIZE -0.1123677* 0.0665471 Negative 
CAR -0.0830715*** 0.0192086 Negative 
BKEF -0.8082228*** 0.2015029 Negative 
LLP 1.138896*** 0.403348 Positive 
R-Square 0.4355 
Notes: The regression is estimated using the random effects model over a sample of 
64 banks from the year 2003 to 2012. ***, ** and * indicate parameter significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.  
 
According to the results from table 5.2, the coefficient could be explained as follows: 
 
The estimated coefficient for real GDP growth rate is negatively but not significant 
UHODWHG WR WKH EDQN¶V QRQ-performing loans ratio, the coefficient is -0.1327511.  
Therefore it suggests that there is no direct relationship between the real GDP growth 
UDWHDQGEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNLQ&KLQese commercial banks. Results is consistent with the 
previous studies from Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), Fofack (2005) and Aver (2008) 
that there is no relationship between the GDP and credit risk. The sign indicates that 
during the economic booming period, the economic activities are increase thus both 
67 
 
the borrowers and banks will hold sufficient cash so that with enhanced repayment 
ability. On the other hand, during the recession period, the repayment ability will 
worse than before, thus increase the loan default probability. However, the 
insignificant coefficient between the real GDP growth rate and NPLs ratio in Chinese 
commercial banking industry can be explained by as the Chinese economy has a 
sustainable economic growth, the fluctuation of the real GDP growth may has a 
insignificant affects on the levels of nonperforming loans in Chinese commercial 
banks. The limited sample data in our research, even our sample data are from year 
2003 to 2013, due to the selection criteria, banks with less than three consecutive 
years will be deleted, thus the time period is not with a enough time span. 
Furthermore, as the Chinese economic is constant growing from the year 2003 to 
2012, thus during the economic booms period, the real GDP growth rate may not have 
DVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWVRQWKHEDQN¶VQRQ-performing loans.  
 
Depend on the previous studies mentioned in the Chapter II, as inflation will 
depreciates the value of money thus reduce the return of the bank, banks will try to 
anticipate the future inflation then adjust the interest rate in order to compensate such 
losses. Normally, a high inflation will lead to a high interest rate, then it will increase 
the obligation of the loan borrowers, an increased debt burden will finally caused an 
increase in default probability. The result is consistent with Gunsel (2008), Zribi and 
Boujelbene (2011), the inflation which is measured by Consumer Price (Annual %) 
has a significant positive relationship (at 5% confidence level) with the NPLs ratio, 
and it indicates that a unit increase in the growth of consumer prices will lead to 
0.0850776 increases in the NPLs ratio, all other variables remaining constant. When 
government faces the inflation problem, a tight monetary policy will be used to keep 
inflation get worse. As tight monetary policies always increasing the interest rate to 
reduce the inflation effects, then tight monetary policies can reduce the amount of 
credit, because banks cannot generate enough income from the interest rates on loans. 
For the companies, a rising price for goods and services also need more cash to 
maintain production. As a result, those borrowers highly rely on loans prefer to 
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choose default.  
 
The relationship between the lending interest rate (INR) and credit risk (NPL) can be 
shown from table has a significant negative relationship (at 5% significance level). 
This result is not consistent with the previous studies conducted by Richard (1999),  
Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Fofack (2005) as their researches suggest there exist 
a positive relationship between the intereVW UDWH DQG EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN ,W FDQ EH
explained that when the interest rate is high, the adverse selection problem will be 
emerged. As mentioned in the theory of adverse selection, even the interest rate is 
high, some borrowers still conscious it is attractive for them to borrower the loans 
with their poor credit quality. Thus banks will pay more attention to such activities, 
conduct a more prudent credit appraisal and monitoring to reduce the adverse effects 
from the lower credit quality borrowers, and thus reduce the non-performing loans.  
 
The explanatory variable of Exchange rate (EXR), which is measured by direct quote 
for U.S dollar are used in this research. E.g. a direct quote for U.S dollar would be 
6.12 Yuan equal to 1 U.S dollar, thus an increase in exchange rate indicates a 
depreciation of local currency. In this model has a significantly negative relationship 
EHWZHHQWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNV13/VUDWLRDWVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHO7KHFRHIILFLHQW
equals to -1.84008 indicates that one unit increase in the value of local currency to 
foreign currency will lead tRXQLWVGHFUHDVHLQEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN13/VUDWLR
The results is consistent with Gunsel (2008), Zribi and Boujelbene (2011) and Castro 
(2013). The results suggest that as the depreciation of local currency will, make the 
domestic industry more expensive to acquire foreign goods and services, finally it will 
affects the price of the local products. Therefore, a higher production cost lead to an 
uncompetitive price lead the domestic firms have difficulty to retain the local 
customers. Higher cost will weaken the competitiveness of export-oriented and affects 
their ability to service their debt adversely. The consequence for this is the increasing 
demand for bank credit to support the additional expenditure caused by the 
depreciation of local currency. In Chinese markets, since china joined WTO in year 
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2001, world trade businesses are more frequently than before, as mentioned in the 
Chapter II, the export of goods and services are now account 33.53% of GDP on 
average in china, thus the export-oriented companies are more vulnerable to the 
fluctuation of foreign exchange fluctuation. As a result, the hypothesis that fluctuation 
RIH[FKDQJHUDWHLVQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHGZLWKEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNLVDFFHSWHG  
 
The regression result of UNR shows the coefficient estimate is significantly negative 
UHODWHGZLWKWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN13/LQWKHHVWLPDWLRQPRGHODWVLJQLILFDQFH
level. This result suggests that unemployment rate has substantial impacts on credit 
risk. However, the sign of coefficient is not consistent with what it was expected. The 
result can be explained that as the increase on unemployment rate, the cash flow of 
household will decrease, banks tend be more cautious for the loan appraisal and 
management. Furthermore, due to the limited data, the results cannot be 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVV RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH DQG EDQN¶V
credit risk in China.  
 
The estimated coefficient of bank size (SIZE), measured by the logarithm of total 
assets, is negatively related to bank credit risk (NPL), with the value of coefficient of 
-0.1123677, the value is statistically significant at 10% confidence level. The negative 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ6,=(DQG13/LQGLFDWHVWKDWDVWKHEDQNVL]HLQFUHDVHVEDQN¶V
credit risk is reduced through lowering the NPLs ratio. This result is consistent with 
Salas and Saurina (2002) Rajan and Dhal (2003), Hu et al. (2004). The results suggest 
that banks with different size and diversified portfolios have a significant impact on 
the loan quality. According to the diversification theory and Diamond (1996), since 
larger banks normally have larger amounts of borrowers with variety kind of 
businesses, a diversified loan portfolio can lower the unsystematic risk. Furthermore, 
due to large banks may involve in variety of business operations rather than those 
mainly rely on the interest income and more experienced in risk management, thus 
through a effective monitoring and appraisal of the credit, larger banks can have more 
ability to control for the credit risk than the smaller banks. Thus the hypothesis that 
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the Banks Size and credit risk is negatively correlated is accepted.  
 
As is shown in the table 5.2, the coefficient obtained for the explanatory variable 
regulatory capital (CAR), which is measured by Total Regulatory Capital to Risk 
Weighted Assets ratio, is negatively related with bank credit risk (NPL) at 1% 
significance level. Holding all other things constant, a unit increase in total regulatory 
capital ratio will result in a 0.8082228 decrease in the proportion of non-performing 
loans to total loans. As the previous studies indicated, low regulatory capital ratio 
corresponds to thinly capitalized banks are more prone to risk. On the other hand, 
banks with higher reported capital ratio are better qualified in absorbing losses. The 
result is consistent with Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
According to the Basel Accords I and II, banks have to hold a minimum 8% capital 
(tier 1 capital plus tier 2 capital) to absorb unexpected losses. As a result, a higher 
total regulatory capital will provide more cushions for absorbing losses and then 
reduce bank problem loans and credit risks.  
 
It can be seen from the Table 5.2 that the relationship between the efficiency ratio and 
bank credit risk is statistically significant negative at 1% significance level. 
Management Efficiency (BKEF), explained by return on average total assets, with a 
coefficient value - LQGLFDWHV WKDW HIILFLHQF\ RI D EDQN¶V PDQDJHPHQW ZLOO
lead to a lower credit risk. The result is consistent with what is was expected in the 
Chapter III, which is the higher the efficiency the lower in credit risk and alternatively 
lower efficiency depict higher credit risk. the result is support the previous studies 
from Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Podpiera and Weil (2008)³EDGPDQDJHPHQW´
indicates that inefficiency will positively related with the future non-performing loans, 
thus a higher efficient management implies a good skills in the credit rating, appraisal 
of collateral and monitoring of loans. Thus the hypothesis that bank efficiency is 
negatively related with the bank credit risk is accepted in this model.  
 
The sign of the coefficient of loan loss provision, which is measured by loan loss 
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provision to total loans ratio, is statistically significant related with the bank credit 
risk (NPL) at 1% significance level. The coefficient value 1.138896 indicates that 
banks with higher rate of problem loans (NPL) exhibit lower level of provision rates. 
The result is similar to Ahmed et al. (1998), Gueyie and Ortiz (2002) and Bikker and 
metzemakers (2004), they found the Loan Loss provision is positively related to credit 
risk. Normally, banks anticipate the levels of potential capital losses thus create loan 
provisions to decrease earning volatility. The Loan provision is based on certain credit 
risk considerations, which are default risk, risk tolerance, and the macroeconomic 
environment (Floro, 2010). Loans can be classified into two groups, the specific and 
general provisions. The former is for absorb the losses in an individually loan while 
the other one is made for a loan portfolio.(Borio and Lowe, 2001) Therefore, if the 
banks expect a high level of default probability of loans and deterioration in loan 
quality, more loan loss provisions will be reserved. Thus the hypothesis that loan loss 
provision and credit risk is positively related is accepted.  
 
Hypothesis 10 - &UHGLWULVNDQGEDQN¶VRZQHUVKLS  
 
This part investigates the hypothesis that if there exist differences in credit risk 
between the state-owned commercial banks DQG RWKHU W\SH¶V EDQNV LQ &KLQHVH 
commercial banks. The following econometric model is employed to get 
quantification relationship between  
 
 D?D?D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵD?D?D?D?௧ ൅ ଶD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ଷD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ସD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ହD㜇?D?௧ ൅ D?଺D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅D?଻D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?଼D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?ଽD?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?ଵ଴D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?௜ǡ௧               (Model 2) 
 
The dummy variable GFC is not including in model 1. Since a new variable is added 
into the econometric model, the multicolinearity and heteroskedasticity are tested 
again to confirm the relevancy and fitness of the econometric model. As the existence 
of heteroskedasticity will biased the OLS regression, VIF test is conducted and the 
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test statistics are shown as Table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.3 VIF values for Model 2 
Independent Variables  VIF 
GDPr 5.04 
INF 1.62 
INR 4.08 
EXR 4.17 
UNR 4.30 
SIZE 2.17 
CAR 1.21 
BKEF 1.27 
LLP 1.06 
OWN 2.14 
Mean VIF 2.71 
 
Similar to the econometric tests conducted in the model 1, the values of VIF is under 
10 thus it can be conclude there is no multicolinearity problem. Furthermore, through 
conductLQJWKH:KLWH¶V*HQHUDO7HVWto detect heteroskedasticity problem, the P value 
(P=0.0132) is lower than the 5% significance level indicates we can reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Finally, Breusch and Pagan test is conducted to test 
the existence of individual heterogeneity for across different banks, the result with 
P-value equal to zero indicates there is individual heterogeneity in the panel data.  
 
The Hausman test statistic value, Prob>chi square equal to 0.085, indicates there is 
has a correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term, thus providing 
a sufficient justification to use the results from the Random Effects regression.  
 
Table 5.4 Random Effects Results for Model 2 
73 
 
Determinants Coefficient Standard Error Nature of 
Correlation 
With NPL 
ratio 
GDPr -0.1343991 0.0870706 Negative 
INR -0.4775727**   0.2107897 Negative 
INF 0.0782006** 0.0387887 Positive  
EXR -1.690927*** 0.2593421 Negative 
UNR -4.295265*** 1.560866   Negative 
SIZE -0.2412012*** 0.0858168 Negative 
CAR -0.089024*** 0.0190152 Negative 
BKEF -0.855666*** 0.1996636 Negative 
LLP 1.099473*** 0.3994716 Positive 
OWN 1.314708** 0.5850396 Positive 
R-Square 0.4613 
Notes: ** and * indicate parameter significance at 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
 
Compared the results with model 1, it is found a similar results with some minor 
variation in their coefficient values. Furthermore, the model 2 employed for the 
hypotheses is also extremely significant with a p-value of 0.0000, moreover, the 
R-square value of 0.4613 indicate that all the variables in the econometric model 2 
can explain 46.13 percent of determinants for Bank credit risk (NPL). Most of the 
significant determinants are reacting in a similar fashion as they did with the model 1.  
 
Compared the results with model 1, it is found a similar results with some minor 
variation in their coefficient values. Furthermore, the model 2 employed for the 
hypothesis H is also extremely significant having a p-value of 0.0000, moreover, the 
R-square value of 0.4613 indicate that all the variables in the econometric model 2 
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can explain 46.13 percent of determinants for Bank credit risk (NPL). Most of the 
significant determinants are reacting in a similar fashion as they did with the model 1. 
 
The dummy variable, OWN, controlling for state-owned banks and other types 
commercial banks (includes City commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, 
and foreign commercial banks) in Chinese banking sector has a coefficient value of 
1.314708 observing a positive correlation. This result indicates that the state-owned 
Chinese banks are likely to have a higher credit risk. The outcome is founded to be 
statistically significant with P>|z| value is 0.025 at 95% confidence level. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of there has no differences between state-owned commercial 
EDQNVZLWKRWKHUW\SHV¶FRPPHUFLDOEDQNVFDQQRWEHDFFHSWHG  
 
There are a number of studies addressing the issue of similarities and difference in 
credit risk among different ownership structure. Even though some of the studies do 
not seem to relate the credit risk directly, but we can still find some factors to explain 
the differences between those different bank groups. As Iannota, Giacomo and Sironi 
(2007) found that public sector banks had poorer loan quality and higher insolvency 
risk than other types of banks while mutual banks had better loan quality and lower 
asset risk than both private and public sector banks, so we can expect that banks in 
different types have different level of credit risk, and the public banks like 
state-owned banks may have more credit risk than others. As the previously studies 
conducted by De Nicolo (2001) and Micco (2004), these studies indicate that state 
RZQHUVKLSLVSRVLWLYHO\UHODWHGZLWKWKHEDQN¶VQRQ-performing loans and insolvency 
risk. As our result is consistent with those studies, thus we can conclude that in 
Chinese banking industry, state owned banks take on more credit risks than other 
banks. Sapienza (2004) indicated three different views to explain the reasons for 
state-owned banks exhibit PRUH ULVN\ WKDQ RWKHUV ³VRFLDO YLHZ´ LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH
state-owned banks have a duty to correct the market failure brought by private banks. 
)URPWKH³SROLWLFDOYLHZ´WKHVWDWH-RZQHGEDQNVFDQEHXVHGWRSXUVXLQJSROLWLFLDQ¶V
private interests, thus the government intervention would lead state-owned banks to 
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consider more political factors rather than economic ones, e.g. most of loans from 
state-owned banks flowed to State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often became 
non-performing loans(Firth et al., 2009). According to the agency view, state-owned 
banks are benevolent maximizers but they are plagued by corruption and 
misallocation.  
 
Furthermore, the result is obtained through compare the state-owned to other three 
main types (joint-stock, city and foreign commercial banks) bank. As different 
ownership structures mean different corporate governance mechanisms and behavior 
choices, which affect bank credit risk as well. From the perspective of agency theory, 
considered that state-owned were less monitored by their owners and had worse 
corporate governance compared with other ownership structure banks, which will 
makes the state-owned banks were more likely to be less prudent, this will affect the 
risk management process in state-owned banks, especially in the credit appraisal and 
monitoring. According to the moral hazard theory, the state-owned banks are more 
likely to be bailed out by the government, this will lead the managers in state-owned 
banks put less effort than other ownership structure banks or divert resources for 
personal benefits.  
 
According to the above analysis, the hypothesis of State-owned banks will take on 
PRUHULVNVWKDQRWKHUW\SH¶VFRPPHUFLDOEDQNLQ&KLQDLV accepted.  
 
Hypothesis 3- 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
Similar to the previously tested hypotheses, as the 2008 global financial crisis caused 
WKH ZRUOG¶V ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP E\ surprise, it is expected that the dummy variable 
GFC08 will provide additional valuable insights of impacts from the financial crisis 
which initiated in 2008 on Chinese commercial banks. Therefore, to establish 
empirically results of the impact of the crisis on credit risk in Chinese commercial 
banks, the following econometric model is expected to provide a conclusive 
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demonstration: 
 D?D?D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵD?D?D?D?௧ ൅ ଶD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ଷD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ସD?D?D?௧ ൅ D?ହD㜇?D?௧ ൅ D?଺D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௧൅ D?଻D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?଼D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?ଽD?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?ଵ଴D?D?D?௜ǡ௧ ൅ D?ଵଵD?D?D?  ?௜ǡ௧൅ D?௜ǡ௧O?D?D?D?D?D? ?O? 
 
The model utilized for this hypothesis includes all the variables as mentioned in the 
Chapter III. Compared to the econometric models employed in the previous 
hypothesis testing, dummy variable GFC08 is included in Model 3. Due to the 
number of variables is increased, it is necessary to detect the multicolinearity problem. 
The result of VIF test is shown in the Table 5.5, values of all variables lower than 10 
indicates there is no multicolinearity problem in this model.  
 
Table 5.5 VIF values for Model 3 
Independent Variables  VIF 
GDPr 5.06 
INF 3.07 
INR 4.13 
EXR 8.03 
UNR 4.41   
SIZE 2.18 
CAR 1.21 
BKEF 1.28 
LLP 1.06 
OWN 2.14 
GFC07 5.71 
Mean VIF 3.48 
 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman test also produce Prob>Chi-square is 0.0000 and 0.9987 
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respectively, ascertaining the applicability of a Random Effects regression. The results 
generated from the RE regression in order to interpret the findings is shown in the 
Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6 Random Effects Results for Model 3 
Determinants Coefficient Standard Error Nature of 
Correlation 
With NPL 
ratio 
GDPr -0.134815 0.0871504 Negative 
INR -0.4755974**   0.2118908 Negative 
INF 0.07481 0.0532069 Positive  
EXR -1.672135*** 0.3413195 Negative 
UNR -4.315814*** 1.578611  Negative 
SIZE -0.2406186*** 0.0865784 Negative 
CAR -0.088933*** 0.0191249 Negative 
BKEF -0.8537638*** 0.2003648 Negative 
LLP 1.098684*** 0.4015753   Positive 
OWN 1.312445** 0.5897239 Positive 
GFC08 -0.0311241 0.3305272 Negative 
R-Square 0.4612   
Notes: ** and * indicate parameter significance at 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
 
The model 3 includes the dummy variable GFC08 does not significantly impact the 
results for the credit risk determinants. As shown in the previous two tests, the results 
are similar in terms of the independent variables and the dummy variables as the 
nature of their relationship between with the Credit risk, although some slightly 
changes in values of the respective Įand ȕ coefficients and the Inflation (INF) in 
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model 3 become insignificant, the overall impact remains the same.  
 
To check the robust outcomes for Hypothesis 11, model 3 provide highly significant 
results with a p-value of 0.0000. Inclusion of the GFC08 to establish the relationship 
between the NPL aims to provide empirical explanation of the impact of 2008 
financial crisis on Chinese commercial banks, the dataset generate a R-squared value 
of 0.4612 indicates that by including all the variables identified in the Chapter III, the 
model can explain 46.12 percent of the factors affect the Chinese commercial banks. 
GFC08 with a coefficient of 0.0311241 observing a negative correlation indicates that 
after year 2008. However, the result with P>|z| of 0.925 indicates the results is 
statistically insignificant. The hypothesis of 2008 global financial crisis has positive 
LPSDFWRQWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNLVQRWDFFHSWHG 
 
As the result shows there has a statistically insignificant relationship between the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the Chinese commercial banks. That means the 2008 
global financial crisis has no impact on WKH &KLQHVH FRPPHUFLDO EDQN¶s credit risk. 
However, the result coefficient is insignificant and do not consistent with what it was 
expected (positive). According to Morrison (2009), the degree of exposure of Chinese 
banking industry to the 2008 financial crisis is ambiguous in some way due to 
Chinese banking industry is do not fully embrace financial liberalization and 
relatively isolated from the world market. Furthermore, to response the financial crisis 
and simulating the demands, Chinese government announced a two-year 4-trillion 
RMB ( 586 billion dollar) package which can be account for 13.3 % of the GDP in 
year 2008 (Zhang, 2010; Morrision, 2009). Moreover, the government decided to 
adopt active fiscal policy and a relative loose monetary policy, reduce the interest rate 
to relax the restrictions on loans thus maintain the economy growth. As a result, the 
real GDP growth rate did not reduce too much (0.4%) and then back to 10.3% in 
2010.  
 
On the other hand, a large amount of money poured into the markets can cause the 
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inflation problem and economic bubble, especially in the real estate market (Wang, 
2010), and finally cause the non-performing loans increase in future. A loose money 
supply can cause the excess of production of capacity problem, the policy encourage 
some industry to hoard raw materials for appreciation and investing in low efficiency 
but high energy consumption projects, even they can contribute the economic boom in 
a short term, but such concentrated and unscientific lending would increase the 
probability of default in a long run. Furthermore, under the 4 trillion simulates 
program, a financing platform have been set up by local government. The local 
government turned lending funds into project capital of subsidiary companies thus the 
financial leverage of bank lending become much larger. As some projects were 
launched rashly during the crisis without a prudent analysis and test the repayment 
capacity, and a large proportion of projects have mortgage the land which is quite 
uncertainty in generating the future profit. These all can be a danger of increase the 
bank¶VFUHGLWULVN  
 
However, due to the complexity of Chinese economy and the empirical result, the 
hypothesis of global financial crisis is positive related to the Chinese commercial 
banks credit risk can be rejected.   
Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Even Chinese banking industry has implemented a series reforms in the last three 
decades, the banking system is still far from a developed and efficient system. In 
order to measure the credit risk more accurately in Chinese unique national conditions, 
an empirical study is carried out to investigate the determinants of credit risk and the 
impacts of 2008 global financial crisis in Chinese commercial banks. Based on the 
previous studies on the credit risk determinants, macro-economic factors and 
bank-VSHFLILFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDUHXVHGDVWKHH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVRIWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLW
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ULVN)XUWKHUPRUHWZRGXPP\YDULDEOHVDUHXVHGIRUGLVWLQJXLVKWKHLPSDFWVRIEDQN¶V
ownership structure and the year period before and after the global financial crisis on 
&KLQHVH FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV¶ FUHGLW ULVN 7KH DQDO\VLV ZDV EDVHG RQ D TXDQWLWDWLYH
approach with a panel dataset consists of 64 Chinese commercial banks from the year 
2003 to 2012. Three econometric models are used in this research. Based on the 
several fairly robust checks, random effects model are adopted in those three models.  
 
6.1 Findings 
 
The obtained result indicates that the real GDP growth rate has a negative but not 
VLJQLILFDQW LPSDFW RQ WKH &KLQHVH FRPPHUFLDO EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN 7KH UHVXOt is not 
consistent with most of previous studies, however, the result is similar to Fofack 
(2005), which indicate there is no any relationship between GDP and credit risk. Such 
result can be explained by during the economic boom period, the repayment ability 
will be increase and then lower the loan default rate, while on the recession period, 
the default rate will increase due to the sufficient cash hold as a result of lower 
economic activities.  
 
The relationship between the inflation and credit in this study which is positive related, 
it can be explained that a high inflation will lead banks increase the interest rate to 
compensate the losses by the depreciation of money. A higher interest rate will also 
LQFUHDVHWKHGHEWEXUGHQIRUWKHERUURZHUVWKXVLQFUHDVHWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN  
 
In this study, the result shows the interest rate has a significant negative impact on the 
EDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNKRZHYHUWKLVUHVXOWLVQRWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKZKDWLWwas expected, the 
explanation for such a result can be the banks take a more prudent credit appraisal and 
monitor process to avoid the lower quality borrower, therefore reduce the effects of 
higher default probability caused by high debt burden.  
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The results for exchange rate and unemployment are both exhibit a significantly 
QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVNV $V WKH H[FKDQJH JRHV XS LQ
other words, a depreciation of the local currency to the foreign currency will lead the 
EDQN¶VFUHGLW risk increase, in this study, the Direct Quotation are used, as the export 
account for almost 33.53 SHUFHQWRIFKLQD¶V*'3WKHH[SRUW-oriented companies are 
vulnerable to the exchange rate fluctuations, an appreciation of foreign currencies will 
increase the cost of imported inputs for the domestic industry thus increase the cost of 
production, a lower profitability affect their ability to service the loans thus finally 
increase the default probability of the companies. The negative relationship between 
the unemployment rate and is not consistent what it was expected in the hypothesis. 
However, the result can be explained by the bank take more cautions on the credit 
lending to reduce the increased default rate brought by the higher debt burden.  
 
For the bank characteristic determinants, the empirical results from this study are all 
consistent with the hypotheses were assumed in chapter III. Evidence suggest the 
&KLQHVHFRPPHUFLDOEDQNV¶FUHGLWULVNLVQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHGZLWKWKHEDQNVL]HDVWKH
larger banks with a diversified loan portfolio and variety of different borrowers then it 
can reduce the systematic risks. Moreover, due to the larger banks may involve in 
variety of businesses rather than those smaller banks which is mainly focus on the 
interest income, thus have more ability to control for the credit risk than the smaller 
RQHV7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHUHJXODWRU\FDSLWDOUDWLRDQGEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNDOVR
signify a higher regulatory capital ratio will lead to Chinese commercial banks suffer 
a lower credit risk. This can be explained by a higher regulatory capital ratio will 
SURYLGHPRUHFXVKLRQIRUWKHXQH[SHFWHGORVVHVWKXVUHGXFHWKHEDQN¶VFUHGLWULVN7KH
results also indicate the relationship between the bank management efficiency is 
statistically negative related to the credit risk of Chinese commercial banks. As the 
bad management hypothesis suggests that inefficiency of management implies a bad 
skills in the rating the credit, collateral appraisal and loans monitoring, finally lead to 
a higher level of credit risk. 
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The result obtained from this study indicates that different ownership structure will 
DIIHFW WKH EDQN¶V FUHGLW ULVN VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQ &KLQHVH FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV 7KH
state-RZQHG EDQNV ZLOO EHDU PRUH FUHGLW ULVNV WKDQ RWKHU W\SH¶V commercial banks. 
According to Sapienza (2004), it can be concluded into three main reasons, the 
political view indicates that the state-owned banks can be used to pursue the 
SROLWLFLDQ¶V SULYDWH LQWHUHVW WKXV VXFK D LQWHUYHQWLRQ ZLOO OHDG VWDWH-owned banks 
consider more political factors rather than economic ones. The social view describes 
that state-owned banks have a duty to correct the market failure brought by private 
EDQNV ³$JHQF\ YLHZ´ VWDWHV WKDW VWDWH-owned banks are plagued by corruption and 
resource misallocation, thus lead to an ineffective management. Therefore, the 
state-owned banks will bear more risks than others. Furthermore, according to the Jia 
(2009) considered that state-owned were less monitored by their owners and has a 
worse corporate governance, it will lead the state-owned banks were likely to be less 
prudent, thus affect the credit appraisal and monitoring. Moral hazard problem can 
also lead the state-owned banks to take on less efforts on the credit risk management, 
cause they firmly believe they will be bailed out by the government. 
 
As the result indicated, 2008 global financial crisis has a no significant effects on the 
EDQN¶VFUHGLWULVNRQWKLVVWXG\7KHUHVXOWFDQEHH[SODLQHGE\WZRUHDVRQV$IWHUWKH
2008 global financial crisis broke out, as the Chinese banking system is still isolated 
from the world markets with inexhaustive embrace financial liberalization, the global 
financial crisis has limited effects on the Chinese banking industry. Moreover, 
Chinese government is take efforts to simulate the Chinese economy with a 4-trillion 
investment in domestic market and a proactive monetary policy was carried out to 
maintain the overall economy growth, thus keep the economic activity. On other hand, 
as the large amount of money poured into the markets it will cause the inflation and 
economic bubble (Wang, 2010), thus finally lead to non-performing loans increase in 
the future. Moreover, as the local government set up the financing platform to lend 
funds to into funds into project subsidiary companies under the 4 trillion package, the 
financial leverage of bank lending become much larger, due to some projects without 
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a prudent analysis and mortgage the land with uncertainties in generate future profit, 
lead to a increasing in bank¶VFUHGLWULVNLQ&KLQHVHFRPPHUFLDOEDQNV 
 
6.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research  
 
As this study is an empirical analysis with quantitative method to investigate the 
determinants of Chinese commercial banks credit risk, it is subject to limitations 
related to the number of the observations in the data sample, as mentioned in the 
previous chapters, due to the opaque banking system in Chinese banking industry,  
the data obtained from the BankScope is limited in numbers, and the bank with less 
than three consecutive years of observations and missing values are excluded from the 
dataset, the final dataset includes 64 commercial banks is a relative small sample size 
in the research. As the Chinese banking system are become more and more 
transparent, therefore the future research based on a large sample with a wide time 
frame to provide more comprehensive study of the credit risk determinants in Chinese 
banking industry. Furthermore, due to current level of non-performing loans may 
depend on its past level, a dynamic model can be used to get a more conclusive results 
for the determinants of credit risk in Chinese commercial banks. 
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